I will attempt to formulate here, upon the thoughts of one 18th century Japanese nationalist philosophy, Motoori Norinaga, a universalism, which is also a nationalism and individualism. It shall be a universalism centered around the regulation of human desires and emotions on the levels of the individual, the nation, and universal humanity; a universalism where the only thing that is universal is the struggle of desires and emotions with those forces which would regulate them. Before formulating it, however, I will first pore through two of Norinaga’s major treatises on poetry, where he also presented a theory of human desires and emotions, in order to extract five concepts which would be of use to us later.
Ashiwake obune: jitsujō, ninjō, and “masculine” feelings
Norinaga proposed, in his first treatise on poetry, Ashiwake obune, the concept of jitsujō (実情, lit. “true feelings”). It appeared in the very first section of the treatise, where it denoted, broadly, “thoughts in the heart”1placeholder (心に思ふこと)2placeholder. Of these thoughts, Norinaga also cited the following examples: “the feelings of the average person in society” (世人の情), which “seek pleasure, loathe distress, while everyone enjoys pleasure, and is saddened by sorrow” (楽しみをばねがひ、苦しみをばいとひ、おもしろきことはたれもおもしろく、かなしきことはたれもかなしき), “wicked heart” (姦邪の心), “feelings of romantic love” (好色の心), and “feelings of virtue”3placeholder (仁義の心, 12)4placeholder. From this section onwards, one commentator, Sagara Tōru, has noted, Norinaga began stripping away particular “thoughts” from the list of “thoughts” denoted by jitsujō. Two senses of jitsujō thus came to being within the treatise, one denoting a broader list of “thoughts,” of feelings, than the other. As it were though, the narrower sense of jitsujō was also used alternatively with the term ninjō (人情, lit. “human feelings”). For convenience and clarity’s sake then, I will refer hereafter to the narrow sense of jitsujō as ninjō instead.
The concept of ninjō was formed, Sagara noted, when Norinaga removed “the sophisticated and masculine feelings of virtue and feeling oriented around good and evil, doctrines and precepts” (さかしき男らしい仁義の心、善悪教誡の心)5placeholder from the list of “thoughts” denoted by jitsujō. What remained after this removal was only the “feelings of the average person in society”, which “seek pleasure, loathe distress, while everyone enjoys pleasure, and is saddened by sorrow”. These feelings are ninjō. If we also look to a relevant passage in the treatise itself, we will also find that Norinaga made a distinction between “masculine, proper, and strict actions” (男らしく正しくきっとしたること) to “ninjō as it is” (ありていの人情), which was “child-like and feminine” (児女子のやうなる) and “frivolous, awkward, and relaxed” (はかなくつたなくしどけなき)6placeholder. The former, he also claimed, was “something added [to ninjō], which controlled and embellished the heart” (心を制してこしらへたるつけ物), and which came into being in the first place only because of social trends, written works, interactions with others, and the like: worldly activities (世間の風にならひ、或は書物に化せられ、人のつきあひ世のまじはりなどにつきて、をのづから出で来)7placeholder. Ninjō then does not only denote “the feelings of the average person in society”, but also “child-like and feminine” feelings. It is also opposed to “masculine” feelings, which are added to ninjō through socialization, consumption of literature, and other life experiences, and which also perform a regulatory function in the human heart. If we look also to the examples Norinaga cited for “masculine” feelings, we will find that these feelings regulate, for the most parts, if not exclusively, ninjō. One such example is that of “the warrior going to the battlefield, ready to sacrifice their life for their lord and nation without the slightest hesitation, and dying a dignified death” (武士の戦場に出でて、君のため国会のためには、一命をすてて露おしまず、いさぎよく死する)8placeholder. Norinaga claimed here, however, that, the warrior was bound to feel sorrow about the spouse and children they left behind in their hometown, and to wish to meet their parents one last time, in the moment of their death (死するときにあたって、故郷にのこしをきたる妻や子をば、かなしく思はざらんや。老いたる親には今一たびも、逢ひたくは思はざらんや)9placeholder. This sorrow and longing are what he called ninjō, and they are found in sages as well as ordinary people (聖人凡人かはることなし)10placeholder, in all human beings. That said, if there are sorrow and longing in the moment of one’s death, then this death cannot be dignified. To die a dignified death then, Norinaga remarked, one must “not show [their sorrow and longing], think of their posthumous reputation, and abandon their precious life for the sake of their lord and family” (色にあらはさず、死後の名を思ひ、君のため家のために、大切なる命をばすて侍る)11placeholder. The “masculine” feelings of a warrior ready to die for their lord, nation, and family without hesitation are not so much feelings as suppressions of feelings which actually are felt, of sorrow and longing; of feelings identified as ninjō.
Taking a step back now to the concept of jitsujō, if we take jitsujō to denote broadly “thoughts in the heart”, as it did in the opening of the treatise, we can say that jitsujō contains within itself two types of feelings. The first type is ninjō, which is “child-like and feminine”, “frivolous, awkward, and relaxed”, and, also, as we have seen in Norinaga’s discussions of the warrior heading to their death, found in sages as well as ordinary people, in all human beings. Content-wise, ninjō includes within itself all kinds of desires and emotions. The second is “masculine” feelings, which are not so much feelings as suppressions and other kinds of regulations performed upon ninjō.
If we look further into the treatise, we can also add to ninjō two other properties: first, it is neither strictly good nor evil. We see this in Norinaga’s discussions of sexual desires and the emotions these desires provoked in human beings, both of which he included under ninjō. Sexual desires, he noted, need not always head in a morally good direction. It is conceivable that a human being who lusts after another’s spouse be moved by their lust to commit heinous acts. This, indeed, Norinaga remarked, is the “way of love”, which provokes in human beings emotions that “are so strong and deep that [they] cannot suppress them” (やむに忍びぬふかき情欲のあるもの), even when they “know…that [these] emotions lead to actions [they] should not engage in”12placeholder (すまじきこととはあくまで心得ながらも)13placeholder. Second, Norinaga claimed that ninjō “is the same in ancient times as well as the present, in China, India, as well as [Japan]” (古も今も、唐も天竺も、此国も、かはることなし)14placeholder. This is, of course, not to say that human beings in all historical eras and nations experience the exact same set of desires and emotions. Norinaga compared the “sameness” of ninjō in all historical eras and nations to the “sameness” of human faces; that all human faces have two eyes, two ears, a nose, and a mouth and are, in this regard, the same (目二つあり、耳ふたつあり、鼻たてにつき、口よこにつき…そのかはざる所かくの如し)15placeholder. At the same time though, “just as no two people are alike” (同じ人なき如く), there are also differences between the ninjō found in different historical eras and different nations, but Norinaga also insisted that the differences were minor (少しづつのかはりめある)16placeholder. In the past as well as the present, in China, India, and Japan, human beings continue to “desire riches, loathe impoverishment and lowliness, enjoying the company of beauties, covet delicacies, wish to spend their days idly and enjoying themselves, enjoy the pleasant, loathe the distressful, pray for fortunes, and despise troubles” (富貴をねがひ、貧賤をいとひ、美色を悦び、美味をむさぼり、安佚をねがひ、楽をこのみ、苦をいとひ、福をねがひ、禍をにくむ)17placeholder. In summary, Norinaga remarked that “what does not change is the same in the past as in the present. What changes changes with every era” (かはらぬ所は昔も今もかはらず。かはる所は世々にうつりゆく)18placeholder.
To summarize, ninjō denotes desires and emotions which are “child-like and feminine”, “frivolous, awkward, and relaxed”, neither strictly good nor evil, and, largely, unchanging throughout history and across the world; while “masculine” feelings denotes the regulation of these desires and emotions. They are also included within a wider concept, jitsujō, which simply denotes the myriad “thoughts in the heart”.
Isonokami Sasamegoto: “feminine” feelings and its other(s)
A similar distinction to that between ninjō and “masculine” feelings is also found in Norinaga’s second major treatise on poetry, Isonokami Sasamegoto. First, in his discussions of the developments of Chinese literature and the influences historical circumstances in China had on these developments, he opened on the claim that “in general no matter how wise people become, if you peer deep into their hearts, they are no different than women and children. In all aspects, there are many things that are trivial and feminine, and this is the same in China”19placeholder (おほかた人はいかにさかしきも、心のおくをたづぬれば、女わらはべにことに異ならず。すべて物はかなくめめしき所多き物にて、もろこしとても同じ事)20placeholder. He continued then to criticize contemporary Chinese writers for being “ashamed of true feelings that are trivial and feminine and…not even represent[ing] these in their speech” (実の情の物はかなくめめしきをば恥かくして、言にもあらはさず)21placeholder and “written works”22placeholder (作り出づる書)23placeholder. Several sections after, in his discussions of literary treatments of love in Chinese and Japanese literature, he, again, criticized, along similar lines, contemporary Chinese scholars for “disdain[ing] and criticiz[ing] love affairs, writing about them in very hateful and negative terms” (色このめる事などをば…つまはじきをしてあはめめつつ、いみじくにくくうとましげに書きしるし), and contemporary Chinese poets for “express[ing] only a liking for the manly, heroic spirit” (大丈夫の雄々しき心ばへをのみ好みととのへて) and “not talk[ing] about the feminine emotions of love, which they regard[ed] as shameful”24placeholder (恋する情の女々しく人わろきさまなどをばはぢていはず)25placeholder. Their censure of love and expression of “manly, heroic” spirits over “feminine” feelings, he claimed, were nothing but decorative appearance” (つくろひかざれるうはべ), and did not “reflect the real truth of the human heart”26placeholder (人の心のまことにあらざる)27placeholder.
Norinaga drew here then a distinction similar to the one in Ashiwake obune, between ninjō, which was said to be “feminine”, and “masculine” feelings which regulated ninjō. He drew here a distinction between child-like, “trivial”, and “feminine” feelings, which are from “deep in the heart”, and which all human beings, in China as well as Japan, have, and “masculine” feelings, which are only added on top of “feminine” ones, as embellishments which cover them up. From Norinaga’s repeated critique of the contemporary Chinese penchant for holding “feminine” feelings in shame and withholding them from representation, we can also gather that “feminine” feelings continue to play the role of feelings which are regulated; through shame and withholding from representation, and, more pertinently, under (literally, since they are covered up) “masculine” feelings.
We should also note that Norinaga did more here than simply repeat the distinction he has already made in his first treatise on poetry. He also, as I have already mentioned earlier in passing, attempted to identify the historical circumstances which conditioned the suppression of “feminine” feelings in contemporary Chinese literature. To start again, now from an earlier beginning, before his discussions of the historical circumstances of China and their bearings on Chinese literature, Norinaga actually observed that ancient Chinese, specifically early Zhou dynasty poetry, was similar to traditional Japanese poetry in spirit; that “poems in the Odes section of the Book of Odes” are written in Chinese, “but the feelings in the poems are every bit the same as poetry in”28placeholder Japan (風雅[詩経]三百篇の詩をみるに、ことばこそ唐めきたれ、心ばへは吾御国の歌といささかもかはる事なし)29placeholder. This, he claimed, was because “the direction the human heart takes is always the same”30placeholder (人の心のゆくへはいづこもいづくも同じ事なるべければ)31placeholder. Immediately after though, he also noted that, “as time passes, the hearts of people and the customs of the land change in various ways, so in later eras we find a great difference between our land and China, and the purpose of Chinese poetry and our poetry is vastly different”32placeholder (世のくだるにつけては、人の心も国のならはしもとりどりにうつりもて行くものにしあれば、後の世にはこことかしこと、何事もこよなうなりて、詩と歌との趣もはるかに異なるやうになむなれりける)33placeholder. Several sections later, Norinaga spoke of this change of the hearts of people and national customs in greater details. He claimed that, since China “was not a divine land” (神の御国にあらぬけにや), it had an abundance of “evil people from ancient times”, who commit[ted] countless acts of ruthlessness” (いと上つ代よりしてよからぬ人のみ多くて、あぢきなきふるまひたへず); and, as the ruling class searched for ways to pacify and govern the nation, “[n]aturally wise and intelligent people came to the fore” (おのづから賢く智り深き人も出で来). The activities of these “wise and intelligent people” (i.e. the Confucian sage-kings) prompted Chinese culture to develop into one where debates about the good and evil of menial affairs were held as a worthy pursuit34placeholder (いささかのわざにも、善さ悪さをわきまへあらそふをいみじき事にして), and China into a nation where “everyone…str[o]ve to appear as if they ha[d] wisdom”35placeholder (人ごとにおのれかしこからむとのみする)36placeholder. This development of Chinese culture, Norinaga claimed, was the cause of the contemporary Chinese penchant for holding “feminine” feelings in shame and withholding them from representation in speech and writing. These historical circumstances of China were also, later, contrasted with Japan which, “being the land of Amaterasu Ōmikami” (吾御国は天照大御神の御国として), had people whose “hearts, actions, and words were honest and elegant, and the land was reigned over peacefully, such that [traditional Japanese poetry] did not become mixed up with practices of speaking and writing incessantly to sound difficult, as it did in [China]” (人の心もなすわざも、いふ言の葉も、只直くみやびなるままにて、天の下は事なく穏ひに治まり来ぬれば、人の国のやうに、こちたくむつかしげなる事はつゆまじらずなむ有りける)37placeholder.
Chauvinism and sudden references to the kami aside, we should note that what Norinaga was speaking here were national differences or, rather, differences between the behaviors of Chinese and Japanese in their respective nations. This, however, does not make complete sense. Norinaga has claimed that human beings in China as well as Japan had the same “feminine” feelings in the depths of their hearts; or, if we look further back to his concept of ninjō, the same set of desires and emotions, driving their actions. How, then, could human beings in China have behaved so differently from those in Japan? To account for this difference, Norinaga brought in the kami, the gods, whose presences and reign over a nation, it would seem, have a direct influence on the moral natures and behaviors of the human beings inhabiting said nation. This is, of course, a difficult explanation for us to accept, we who live in a predominantly secular age. If we do not wish to throw away his explanation altogether, we would have to focus less upon the kami themselves and more on Norinaga’s qualification of one nation as a “divine land” and another as not so. In other words, we convert Norinaga’s talk of the kami into a talk of national circumstances38placeholder. This would allow us to say that, for Norinaga, while human beings in China as well as Japan have the same “feminine” feelings “deep in their hearts”, their behaviors differ from one another because of the different national circumstances they lived under.
These differences in national circumstances and human behaviors then breed more differences. The havoc wreaked by human beings in China prompted its culture to develop from its ancient form, which was still tolerant of “feminine” feelings and allowed for their representation in literature, into its contemporary form, which celebrated only “masculine” feelings and has expelled “feminine” feelings from literature. As its culture developed into this form, its people likewise began feeling and behaving differently; more specifically, in ways opposed to “feminine” feelings. New feelings are formed, such as the shame now felt before “feminine” feelings, which led to the withholding of these feelings from representation in speech and writing. Preexistent feelings might also be modified, into feelings which no longer qualify as “feminine”. Human behaviors in China, in other words, conditioned the differentiation of the national circumstances they occurred under, which developed into forms which are opposed to “feminine” feelings. These differentiated circumstances, in turn, conditioned the differentiation of human behaviors, which likewise developed into forms opposed to “feminine” feelings.
The same; or, rather, the same process, inverted content-wise, also occurred in Japan. The lack of civil conflicts and general chaos within Japanese borders meant that its culture did not develop in the same direction as China. Its culture remained tolerant of “feminine” feelings and their representation in literature, and the Japanese (people) likewise remained so. In other words, while the national circumstances of China and the behaviors of the Chinese became increasingly antagonistic towards “feminine” feelings, the national circumstances of Japan and the behaviors of the Japanese remained more-or-less unchanged with respect to their tolerance of “feminine” feelings. Different national circumstances, then, have meant different human behaviors, which meant, in turn, different directions national circumstances differentiated in and, in turn, different directions human behaviors differentiated in. These differences and differentiations also revolve around “feminine” feelings and what we can broadly call its “other”—“masculine” feelings which are not necessarily felt but put to words nonetheless to cover up the “feminine” feelings we did feel, general senses of shame over the “feminine” feelings we have felt, and so on.
If Norinaga has proposed, then, in Ashikwake obune an interconnected but, largely, static series of concepts (i.e. ninjō, the “masculine” feelings which regulate ninjō, and jitsujō which contain them), we may say that he has proposed in Isonokami Sasamegoto two extremely lively ones. “Feminine” feelings are, as before, opposed to “masculine” and, in general, feelings which are not “feminine”, which are suppressive of the “feminine”, and so forth; but their opposition is alive. Human beings lead nationally specific lives within this opposition, and they revise their feelings, speech, writing, and, in general, their behaviors endlessly within it. The national circumstances they live under, which determine their ways of life, likewise change without end within this opposition. The world turns as the “feminine” struggles against its other(s). Cultures are transformed and individual lives reshaped by this struggle. The world turns because of the struggle of the “feminine” against its other(s).
Neo-Norinagism: jitsujō, ninjō, not-ninjō
Now, bringing together the concepts and distinctions Norinaga put forth in Ashiwake obune and Isonokami Sasamegoto, and formalizing them with the terminologies of European philosophy, I propose here the following schema for a Neo-Norinagism.
(1) In the beginning there are human beings, distributed across the world in their respective nations, desiring, feeling, regulating their desires and emotions within and with respect to their specific national circumstances39placeholder. Your feelings, my feelings; Chinese feelings, Japanese feelings; variously illuminated by the sun (= Amaterasu Ōmikami)40placeholder.
(2) Jitsujō is a concept framed after surveying the myriad desires, emotions, and regulations of desires and emotions found in human beings. It is, following Norinaga’s definition for the term in Ashiwake obune, a universal containing all particular “thoughts in the heart”.
These “thoughts” are, however, not indifferent to one another. There are oppositions between these “thoughts”. To account for them, jitsujō is divided into two. Ninjō and not-ninjō are framed, two other universals which are opposed to one another.
(3) Ninjō is a universal à la the ninjō formulated in Ashiwake obune, which contains all particular desires and emotions found in human beings across the world. These particular desires and emotions are also always formed, à la the “feminine” feelings formulated in Isonokami Sasamegoto, with respect to the specific national circumstances these desires and emotions occur under (e.g. under national cultures which censure certain desires and emotions and are tolerant of others).
(4) Not-ninjō is a universal containing all particular “feelings” which regulate ninjō; everything from the “masculine” feelings spoken of in Ashiwake obune, which are formed through regulation (chiefly, suppression) of ninjō, to the shame spoken of in Isonokami Sasamegoto, which is felt about one’s “feminine” feelings. They are, like ninjō, also formed with respect to the specific national circumstances they occur under.
(5) Ninjō, or, rather, the particular desires and emotions under ninjō, condition the differentiation of the national circumstances they occur under (e.g. national cultures), just as the “feminine” feelings formulated in Isonokami Sasamegoto do41placeholder. They trigger within the nations they occur within cultural revolutions42placeholder, which create new desires and emotions as well as release censured ones, submit yet-uncensured desires and emotions to censure as well as intensify preexistent censure.
(6) These differentiated national circumstances condition, in turn, the differentiation of the particular desires, emotions, and regulations of desires and emotions of human beings living under these circumstances. They condition, in other words, the differentiation of the particular contents of ninjō and not-ninjō.
This differentiation also unfolds within the opposition of ninjō to not-ninjō. This opposition develops, on the levels of the nation and the individual, as the contents of ninjō and not-ninjō differentiate: as the cultures of some nations evolve into forms where not-ninjō dominates ninjō (e.g. contemporary China in Norinaga’s account of Chinese and Japanese history in Isonokami Sasamegoto, whose culture evolved into one which celebrated “masculine” feelings and shunned “feminine” ones), while others’ evolve or remain in forms where ninjō remains more-or-less at peace with not-ninjō (e.g. Japan in Norinaga’s account of Chinese and Japanese history, whose culture remained tolerant of “feminine” feelings); and as individual human beings inhabiting these nations, drawn by their national cultures, likewise begin privileging ninjō over not-ninjō or otherwise.
(7) Returning now to jitsujō, which, we can say, contains the particular contents of ninjō and not-ninjō: the differentiation of the contents of ninjō and not-ninjō surely means differentiation of the content of jitsujō as well. This differentiation, like the differentiation of the contents of ninjō and not-ninjō, is also inseparable from the opposition of ninjō to not-ninjō. Jitsujō has, through its division into ninjō and not-ninjō, developed as a universal. It can no longer be indifferent to the oppositions between its particulars, and now includes within itself both the particulars of ninjō and not-ninjō and their oppositions. It is no longer an unmarked container unconcerned with what is put inside of it, and has become, instead, a battlefield, the site of the opposition of ninjō and not-ninjō, of their struggle against one another. The differentiation of the content of jitsujō, in turn then, can be seen as nothing other than this struggle itself, developing in every nation and individual.
(8) As the particular contents of jitsujō, ninjō, and not-ninjō differentiate, and the opposition between ninjō and not-ninjō develops—that is to say, as different forms of desires, emotions, and regulations of desires and emotions come and go, in all human hearts, in all the nations of the world—the circumstances of these nations (e.g. their cultures) likewise differentiate and develop. As they do, the desires, emotions, and regulations of the human beings inhabiting these nations also, and again, differentiate and develop. In differentiating and developing, they condition also further differentiations and developments in national circumstances, to condition further differentiations and developments of desires, emotions, and regulations, ad infinitum. The differentiation of the contents of jitsujō, ninjō, and not-ninjō, the development of the opposition of ninjō and not-ninjō, and the differentiation of national circumstances are three processes inseparable from one another, which conditions one another or are simultaneous with one another.
Now, if we take history to mean the development of nations and the human beings inhabiting these nations, then history is, essentially (or, rather, can be conceptualized as), the three processes we have spoken of here, unfolding one after the other and alongside one another. It is the differentiation of national circumstances (e.g. national cultures), as conditioned by the particular contents of jitsujō, ninjō, and not-ninjō (e.g. cultural revolutions); the differentiation of the particular contents of these three universals, as conditioned by the differentiation of the national circumstances they occur under; and, finally, the development of the opposition between ninjō and not-ninjō, which the differentiation of the particular contents of jitsujō, ninjō, and not-ninjō always doubles as.
More poetically now, it is the tale of humanity shaping, with their desires, emotions, and regulations of desires and emotions, the nations they inhabit, and these nations shaping them back, in return; each time creating a new humanity with new desires, emotions, and regulations, poised to shape, again, the nations which have shaped them, and to be reshaped themselves, again, again, and again. It is the ever-changing lives of countless individual human beings desiring, feeling, and regulating in their respective nations, and in the midst of a universal humanity, represented by jitsujō, ninjō, and not-ninjō, which likewise desires, feels, and regulates. It is the endless struggle of desires and emotions against those forces which would regulate them and vice versa, in the souls of the individual (self-regulation and its failures) and the nation (e.g. censures and tolerance of particular desires and emotions within national cultures), which spills again and again into cultural revolutions in every nation. It is the soul of humanity, unfolding in the struggles to be freed from regulations as to be fettered by them, in cultural revolutions.
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Motoori, “IS”, trans. Bentley, 210.
Motoori, “IS”, ed. Koyasu, 257.
Motoori, “IS”, trans. Bentley, 210.
Motoori, “IS”, ed. Koyasu, 257.
Motoori, “IS”, trans. Bentley, 210.
Motoori, “IS”, ed. Koyasu, 257.
See Motoori, “IS”, ed. Koyasu, 210.
Motoori, “IS”, trans. Bentley, 211.
Motoori, “IS”, ed. Koyasu, 260.
Motoori, “IS”, ed. Koyasu, 264.
Being a “divine land” can be taken, for one, to mean a land endowed with certain natural features, which shaped the behaviors of the human beings inhabiting them in certain ways. This is so because the kami are not strictly anthropomorphic deities. In his discussions of the word “kami” in his later works, Norinaga has argued that, when a sea or mountain was spoken of as a kami, “kami” does not refer to the spirit of the sea or mountain, but to the sea or mountain itself. Amaterasu Ōmikami, the sun kami, was also held by Norinaga, in his later works, to be the sun itself. See Motoori Norinaga, “In Defense of the Japanese Way” in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. James W. Heisig et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011), 479, and Motoori Norinaga, Kokun Kojiki-den 1, (Nihon meicho kankō-kai, 1930), 140-141.
By “national circumstances”, I refer to the customs of nations, which Norinaga spoke the most often of, in Ashiwake obune, Isonokami Sasamegoto, and later works on Shinto theology and cosmology, as well as the political, among other (e.g. environmental; see note 39), circumstances of these nations.
See note 39.
It bears noting here that individual human beings, who have these desires and emotions, or ninjō, do not only stand to change the circumstances of the nation they inhabit, but also the circumstances of other nations as well. Norinaga’s account of history in Isonokami Sasamegoto has an international dimension, which I did not bring up here. He argued that Japanese culture, and life in general, underwent Sinicization with the introduction of Chinese writings into Japan. Traditional Japanese poetry, for one, which plainly expressed “feminine” feelings, fell out of favor, while works mimicking contemporary Chinese styles rise to prominence. The Japanese imperial court, for another, as Norinaga noted in his later works, also adopted practices of the Chinese court. We have one instance here then where individuals from one nation (settlers, envoys, etc. carrying Chinese writings) conditioned the differentiation of the circumstances of another nation (the literary traditions, political infrastructure, etc. of Japan). See Motoori, “IS”, ed. Koyasu, 264-265, and Motoori Norinaga, “Naobi no mitama” in An anthology of kokugaku scholars, 1690-1868, trans. John Bentley (Cornell University East Asian Program, 2017), 405.
By “cultural revolution” I refer to such events as the establishment of the “way of the sages” in ancient China, which was preceded by a revolution which overthrew the Shang dynasty and established the Zhou, and dramatically transformed the cultural landscape of China, hence warranting the name “cultural revolution”. It goes without saying too that the desires and emotions of individual human beings stand to effect less dramatic changes to national cultures as well.