Berkeley/Norinaga/Marx; Awareanalysis, Part 1: exchange, discourse, morality, feelings
What is Awareanalysis? It is a monstrosity assembled from the idealism of an Anglo-Irish bishop, recently scandalized for his ownership of slaves, the poetics and psychology of a Japanese nationalist, who dedicated much of his life to expunging Chinese influences and restoring native Japanese meaning, and the materialism of Karl Marx, patron saint of social movements. As its blood, it has a contextualism which declares that everything happens in a context. As its soul, it has a sick humor which amuses itself by having conservative, even, reactionary voices speak revolutionary words. It is such a monstrosity, which I, jokingly, call Awareanalysis.1placeholder
Berkeleian realism, language, and informed naivety
In a previous article, I have attempted to formulate a position I called “Berkeleian realism”. It is not a position which affirms the absolute reality of anything. Rather, it is a position which oscillates between naive realism and Berkeleian idealism. In other words, it oscillates between a position which holds the objects of experience to be absolute, mind-independent objects, and another position which holds the objects of experience to be sensations and representations of sensations, inseparable from mental activities. To this, I would like to add two more features:
To the Berkeleian idealist position, I would like to add a linguistic component. Kenneth Pearce, in his reading of Berkeley’s theories of language in Language and the Structure of Berkeley’s World, has argued that bodies, i.e. the apples, tables, and other objects we perceive and operate daily, in Berkeley’s idealist philosophy, should not be regarded as collections of sensations, to which the mind, i.e. the Berkeleian idealist subject, afterwards, attaches various names, i.e. “apple”, “table”, and so forth.2placeholder Rather, these names for bodies organize sensations into bodies. These names “provid[e] a way of talking [sensations]”3placeholder and “giv[e] us a way to organize and predict our ideas [i.e. the sensations we perceive and the representations of sensations we form by memory and imagination], a useful way of structuring the deliverances of the senses, helping us to get around in the world”.4placeholder With these names, the Berkeleian idealist subject “group[s]…sensible qualities together by attributing them to a common subject, which is to say, predicating them of some noun phrase”.5placeholder In other words, from the Berkeleian idealist position, in the Berkeleian idealist experience of the world, the many names we have for the many objects we encounter in the world are not names attached to freestanding collections of sensations, but names with which sensations become organized into the objects we are so familiar with. An apple is a collection of sensations collected through our use of the name “apple”. A table is a collection of sensations collected through our use of the name “table”.
On top of these names, Pearce also argued, there are other terms, such as the term “force” and the many symbols for expressing the magnitude of “force” in physical theory, whose uses allow us to form accounts and predictions concerning the sensations we have already grouped under the names for bodies.6placeholder Berkeley argued in De Motu, his critique of Newtonian mechanics,7placeholder and Siris, an essay exhorting the virtues of tar water,8placeholder that, while motions are sensible, forces, which are thought to bring about motions, are not. “Forces”, as Pearce put it, are “not simply part of the world as we find it”, but “part of a theoretical construction we create to make sense of that world”.9placeholder Concerning the uses of the term “force” and associated symbols, “[w]ithin the physical theory, the laws connect the force to observable phenomena [i.e. the motions of bodies], and it is on the basis of those phenomena that we attribute the force to the body”.10placeholder In other words, we form accounts of the motions of bodies with the term “force” and associated symbols. In these accounts, we hold that forces have brought about these motions. These accounts “guide our actions and expectations”, as, “once we [have] attribute[d] a certain force to a body, we can predict other effects besides the one on the basis of which we attributed the force in the first place”.11placeholder In a word, from the Berkeleian idealist position, in the Berkeleian idealist experience of the world, the Berkeleian idealist subject experiences the world as a world of sensations and representations of sensations organized, accounted for, and predicted under various names, terms, symbols, and so forth. The Berkeleian idealist experience of the world has a linguistic component, inseparable from its sensible components.
For the Berkeleian realist position, I would like to clarify the characters of its oscillations between naive realism and Berkeleian idealism. The first oscillation has a character completely different from its second. This is so because the first oscillation oscillates from naive realism to Berkeleian idealism. It has the character of exposure, because, in this oscillation, the objects to which the Berkeleian realist subject has attributed absolute, mind-independent reality are shown to be sensations and representations of sensations inseparable from the subject’s mental activities. The second oscillation, which oscillates from Berkeleian realism, back, to naive realism, has the character of informed naivety. I borrow this term, “informed naivety”, from the “metamodernists”, who used the term to signify a prominent “structure of feeling”12placeholder of our times, which
“oscillates between the modern and the postmodern…between a modern enthusiasm and a postmodern irony, between hope and melancholy, between naivete and knowingness, empathy and apathy, unity and plurality, totality and fragmentation, purity and ambiguity”.13placeholder
Furthermore,
“[e]ach time the metamodern enthusiasm swings toward [modern] fanaticism, gravity pulls it back toward [postmodern] irony; the moment its [postmodern] irony sways toward [postmodern] apathy, gravity pulls it back toward [modern] enthusiasm”.14placeholder
In any case, I appropriate the term, “informed naivety”, to signify a oscillation, which oscillates from Berkeleian idealism to naive realism, after a prior oscillation from naive realism to Berkeleian idealism. The Berkeleian realist subject has, prior, exposed the absolute, mind-independent reality it believed in to be mind-dependent, but, nevertheless, it wants to believe otherwise. Hence, it does so, knowing full well that its belief cannot hold water. This is the second oscillation. This second oscillation contains the potential for a third, which is like the first, and has the character of re-exposure. Because the subject knows, to some measure, the truth of its belief, its belief is always on the verge of collapse. When its belief collapses, it completes a third oscillation, which returns it to the Berkeleian idealist position, which, again, sees the objects of its experience as mind-dependent sensations and representations of sensations, linguistically organized, accounted for, and predicted.
In other words,
(exposure) (informed naivety) (re-exposure)
naive realism → Berkeleian idealism → naive realism → Berkeleian idealism
Norinaga, the appearance of human feelings, the speech and writing of the other, and international exchange
In several previous articles, I have considered Motoori Norinaga’s concept of unendurable feelings15placeholder in his early writings on poetry and literature in general. The human mind, having felt and attempted to endure strong feelings, fails to endure these strong feelings, and these feelings become expressed, spontaneously, in poetry.16placeholder This, for Norinaga, is how poetry is produced. What I have not addressed, however, is how the human mind, in the first place, comes to know of its feelings. If the mind would speak of its feelings, it must have, first, encountered these feelings. Its feelings must have appeared to it. How, then, does it encounter its own feelings? How do its feelings appear to it?
It seems to me that, for Norinaga, human feelings appear to the mind which feels them in moral judgments and actions, which are informed by the speech and writing of the other. The human mind endures its feelings, not out of nowhere, but because it has judged its feelings, and the actions which may follow from them, to be morally bad. In his commentary on the Tales of Genji, Shibun Yōryō, Norinaga wrote,
“The heart is moved when it, spontaneously, cannot help but be moved by something. It is our own heart, but it also cannot be controlled by us at will. Hence, there are times when our hearts are moved by bad things as well. Knowing that things are bad and we ought not be moved by it, we, nevertheless, spontaneously, cannot help but be moved by them”.17placeholder
The subject, having passed the moral judgment that being moved by morally bad things is, itself, morally bad, strives to prevent itself from being moved by morally bad things. Here we have a moral judgment, and a moral action following from this judgment, i.e. the act of attempting to prevent oneself from being moved by morally bad things.18placeholder In this moral judgment and action, the subject’s own feelings also appear to it, as morally bad feelings which should not be felt.
In the first place, the subject passes this moral judgment because it has been exposed to the speech and writing of the other. Norinaga, who was a consistent critic of Confucian and Buddhist thought, argued, in Shibun Yōryō,
“Because Confucian and Buddhist teachings came into being from human feelings, they cannot stand in complete opposition to human feelings. That said, because there are good as well as bad human feelings, the attempts of Confucian and Buddhist teachings to foster goodness and suppress badness, to educate people so that they become good, and, harshly, restrict bad behaviors, are in opposition to human feelings”.19placeholder
Confucian and Buddhist thought are moral principles which call for severe regulation of human feelings. The human mind, following Confucian and Buddhist thought, follows these moral principles as well. Confucian and Buddhist thought, which are not native to Japan, were introduced into Japan through Chinese writings. A mind which severely regulates its feelings with regard to Confucian and Buddhist thought has, as its historical background, international exchange between China, Korea,20placeholder and Japan, which saw Chinese writings, and the Confucian and Buddhist thought presented within them, introduced into Japan.
Other than Confucian and Buddhist thought, Norinaga, in his treatise on poetry, Isonokami Sasamegoto, also suggested poetry, or, rather, the human mind’s exposure to the poetry of others, as another condition for its regulation of its feelings.21placeholder Discussing the uses of poetry, Norinaga wrote,
“Because poetry expresses as they are the joys, sorrows, and other deep emotions felt by their poets, the audience, seeing and hearing poetry, is deeply moved by events they may never encounter in their lives, and learn to speculate, ‘If I do this to this kind of person, they will feel this’, ‘If I do this, they will be happy’, ‘If I do this, they will hold a grudge against me’…Spontaneously, the audience’s heart becomes deeply moved and considerate. They come to know that they must not do evil deeds for the sake of others”.22placeholder
In other words, the human mind’s exposure to the poetry of others allows it to gain knowledge of the temperaments of others.23placeholder It learns that, if it takes so-and-so actions, it would provoke so-and-so feelings in others. Therefore, it knows not to take morally bad actions for the sake of others and acts with regard to this knowledge. The human mind, exposed to the poetry of others, passes moral judgments on its actions and acts with regard to its judgments. It does not only judge and act with regard to its own actions, however. Earlier on, with regard to love and the morally bad actions which have, historically, followed from love, Norinaga has written,
“There are many examples of people, wise men as well as simple ones, who, once their heart begins to go astray with love, act against reason. Eventually, they cause the downfall of their lands and ruin themselves. It would be impossible to count the number of people, past and present, who managed to destroy their reputations because of their behavior”.24placeholder
Morally bad actions have followed from feelings associated with love. Actions follow from feelings. If, therefore, the human mind, which has been exposed to the poetry of others, strives to regulate its actions, it must regulate, also, its feelings. Indeed, for the most parts, it would be regulating its feelings, It regulates its actions by preventing these actions from being taken. What the human mind is, really, contending with, then, is the “germs” of its actions, i.e. the feelings these actions follow from.
What we have with Norinaga, is the following: the human mind encounters its own feelings in moral judgments it passes upon these feelings, with regard to the speech and writing of the other, e.g. Chinese writings and the poetry of others, and in moral actions it takes with regard to its judgments. Human feelings appear to the human mind in these moral judgments and actions informed by the speech and writing of the other.25placeholder
With regard to the other whose speech and writing inform the mind’s moral judgments and actions, I must also emphasize, first, that the other is not necessarily an authoritative other. When the poetry of others informs the mind’s moral judgments and actions, the others who spoke and wrote are ordinary, weak-willed, and, even, morally bad others. They produced poetry, because they, too, have encountered their own feelings in moral judgments and actions. Having passed moral judgments that their feelings are morally bad, they have attempted to endure their feelings, and failed. Therefore, poetry was produced. They are, therefore, at the very least, not morally authoritative others. When the other who speaks and writes is a Confucian sage and Buddhist saint, however, they are, obviously, authoritative others.
I would also like to emphasize that the others whose speech and writing inform the moral judgments and actions of the mind are, also, not necessarily others belonging to the same nation as the mind. We see this clearly with Chinese writings. The others who wrote, here, are, obviously, not Japanese, but Chinese. Nevertheless, because of international exchanges, Chinese writings were introduced into Japan, and the Japanese mind was exposed to Confucian and Buddhist thought. What speech and writing of the other informs the mind’s moral judgments and actions, we may say, is determined by international exchanges, or, more precisely, exchanges of objects between nations.
Marx and the leap into exchange
In the third chapter of the first volume of Capital, Marx called the sale of a commodity a salto mortale. This, it seems to me, means that the sale of a commodity is not guaranteed to succeed. The money the seller wishes to acquire from this sale is
“in some one else’s pocket. In order to entice the money out of that pocket, our friend’s commodity must, above all things, be a use-value to the owner of the money”.26placeholder
Marx, then, continued to list out uncertainties concerning the sale, but, it seems to me, he has already pointed out the main uncertainty concerning the sale, and, in general, the relinquishing of any commodity in exchange to the other, in the second chapter. All commodities which are relinquished to the other in exchange are “are non-use-values for their owners, and use-values for their non-owners”, that is to say, they are useless to their owners and useful to the other, but “[w]hether that labour [expended in the production of a commodity] is useful for others, and its product consequently capable of satisfying the wants of others, can be proved only by the act of exchange”.27placeholder In other words, there is no knowing for certain that the commodity one is relinquishing in exchange is useful to the other until the exchange has occurred. The act of exchange, when it does occur, is the definitive proof of the usefulness of a commodity to the other.
When an exchange of commodities has occurred, the commodities are also shown to be valuable, or, rather, have exchange value.28placeholder Exchange “puts [commodities] in relation with each other as values, and realises them as values”.29placeholder Each, former, owner of commodity, in a successful exchange, also acquires the other’s commodity, which is the “equivalent” of their own commodity, or the material expression of the value of their commodity.30placeholder Looking at the other’s commodity they acquired in exchange, they say, “So this is how much my commodity is worth”. In a word, upon a successful exchange, commodities are shown to be valuable in exchange and useful to the other.
The success of an exchange, however, is never guaranteed. Uncertainties abound before the exchange, even if the owners of commodities have, previously, engaged in exchanges of the same commodities. As Marx put it in the third chapter, concerning the first uncertainty in the sale of a commodity,
“division of labour is a system of production which has grown up spontaneously and continues to grow behind the backs of the producers. The commodity to be exchanged may possibly be the product of some new kind of labour, that pretends to satisfy newly arisen requirements, or even to give rise itself to new requirements. A particular operation, though yesterday, perhaps, forming one out of the many operations conducted by one producer in creating a given commodity, may to-day separate itself from this connexion, may establish itself as an independent branch of labour and send its incomplete product to market as an independent commodity. The circumstances may or may not be ripe for such a separation. To-day the product satisfies a social want. Tomorrow the article may, either altogether or partially, be superseded by some other appropriate product”.31placeholder
Another uncertainty Marx pointed out, in the sale of a commodity, concerns the sum of money at which the commodity would be bought.
“We leave out of consideration here any accidental miscalculation of value by our friend…We suppose him to have spent on his product only that amount of labour-time that is on an average socially necessary. The price then, is merely the money-name of the quantity of social labour realised in his commodity. But without the leave, and behind the back, of our weaver, the old-fashioned mode of weaving undergoes a change. The labour-time that yesterday was without doubt socially necessary to the production of a yard of linen, ceases to be so to-day, a fact which the owner of the money is only too eager to prove from the prices quoted by our friend’s competitors”.32placeholder
In other words, the success of a sale is never guaranteed, nor is the sum of money it is bought for guaranteed to be the sum anticipated by its seller. This is because social division of labor, the means of production, and so forth, develop “behind” the seller’s back. The sale of a commodity, and, in general, the relinquishing of one’s commodity to the other in exchange, is a leap. There is no certainty that it would not miss its mark, but what happens when it misses its mark is quite certain. The owner of the commodity would be left with a useless object. It is equally certain what would happen if the leap finds its mark. The commodity, successfully sold, would be shown to be valuable in exchange and useful to the other.
Norinagism with Berkeleian realist and Marxist characteristics, or Awareanalysis
I would like to begin by reiterating Norinaga’s account of human subjectivity. The human mind encounters its own feelings in the moral judgments and actions taken with regard to these feelings, informed by the speech and writing of the other. The other whose speech and writing inform the mind’s moral judgments and actions, and, therefore, condition the appearance of the mind’s own feelings to it, is not necessarily an authoritative other, nor is it necessarily an other belonging to the same nation as the mind. International exchanges allow the mind to become exposed to the speech and writing of foreign others. International exchanges determine whose speech and writing would inform the mind’s moral judgments and actions.
Put more generally, the mind always encounters in a context. The context is a stage of good and evil, where its own feelings appear to it. They do not appear merely as themselves. Like actors appearing on a stage to their audience, they appear as themselves acting out a script written by another. They appear as morally good and bad feelings, in accordance to the speech and writing of the other. What speech and writing of the other conditions the appearances of the mind’s own feelings to it is determined, also, by international exchange. Behind the stage of good and evil where human feelings appear, is a marketplace buzzing with traffic between nations.
Now, the mind does not stand at a distance from this marketplace. If it is the mind of a trader, an envoy, and so forth, it directly engages in exchange with foreign others and is exposed to the speech and writing of foreign others at their sources. If it is not the mind of a trader, an envoy, and so forth, it cannot hear and read the speech and writing of foreign others at their sources. Traders, envoys, and so forth, must, first, bring the speech and writing of foreign others into the nation, in the form of books. Then, the mind acquires these books and consume them, thereby becoming exposed to the speech and writing of foreign others. Behind the stage of good and evil, then, are not just international marketplaces, but national marketplaces as well, which the mind participates in. Its participation in these marketplaces is how it becomes exposed to the speech and writing of foreign others, which, later, inform its moral judgments and actions. This participation conditions the appearances of its feelings to it in these judgments and actions.
Recalling Marx now, the successful participation of the mind in international and national marketplaces is not something which necessarily occurs. Participating in a marketplace means bringing a commodity it owns to the marketplace, to exchange it for another commodity the other owns. The success of this exchange is never guaranteed. Uncertainties abound, and the exchange can always fail. When the exchange fails, the mind is left with a useless object, and it cannot acquire the other’s commodity. More importantly, recalling Norinaga now, it cannot consume the other’s commodity. Where this commodity is Chinese writings, its inability to consume this commodity also means it is not exposed to the speech and writing of foreign others. This lack of exposure, in turn, means it cannot pass moral judgments and take moral actions towards its feelings, in accordance to Confucian and Buddhist thought, presented in these Chinese writings. It does not enter into a context where it encounters its feelings, and its feelings appear to it, in moral judgments and actions informed by the speech and writing of foreign others.
Recalling Berkeley, or, rather, the Berkeleian realism I have formulated, too, the mind does not always recognize that it encounters in a context. In the beginning, it may take everything it encounters to be mere “objective reality”. This is the naive realist position, and, from this position, it may proceed to a more critical position, which, at its most extreme, may take the form of Berkeleian idealism. This more critical position is the position which exposes everything the mind has taken to be objective reality as something not only subjective, but linguistically, culturally, historically, ideologically, and so forth, constituted. In Berkeleian idealism, the apples, desks, and so forth we encounter daily are sensations organized by the names, “apple”, “desk”, and so forth, into the bodies we are so familiar with. Their motions are accounted for and predicted through terms such as “force” and associated symbols in physical theory. Language is woven into every aspect of life. We may say the same of culture, history, ideology, and so forth. Indeed, Norinaga did. In Isonokami Sasamegoto, concerning Chinese writings and China, he wrote,
“[M]any evil people from ancient times…commit[ted] countless acts of ruthlessness. This injured many people and threw the country into chaos, and resulted in long periods of unrest. To pacify and govern the land, the rulers worried and pondered, searching for a way to make things better. Naturally wise and intelligent people came to the fore, and they began to ponder and think about even minute things that did not require much thought and they added forced definitions about logic that one cannot see. And they divided even menial things into good and evil, establishing debate about such things as a worthy pursuit, and the customs of that land naturally evolved in such a way that everyone over there strives to appear as if they have wisdom. Thus, they became ashamed of true feelings that are trivial and feminine and do not even represent these in their speech. How much more in their written works it is that they write only things that are decent and reasonable”.33placeholder
Wars and, in general, societal chaos shaped Chinese culture into one which privileged intellectual activities and debates about the moral goodness and badness of things. They determined how the Chinese language would be used, i.e. to signify only “decent and reasonable” things, and not used, i.e. to signify “trivial and feminine” feelings. The transformation of Chinese culture and language uses always have, as their background, not only a history of wars and societal chaos, but also a ruling class which strove to pacify the nation and maintain their reign over it. They have, as their background, a history of wars and societal chaos, and a ruling ideology devised, in the face of wars and societal chaos, to govern the nation. This ideology also spread, beyond the ruling class, into the ruled classes. This permeation of ruling ideology across every aspect of Chinese society, for Norinaga, was how Chinese culture and uses of the Chinese language became the way they were.
Nevertheless, the mind may not recognize that it encounters everything in a linguistic, cultural, historical, ideological, and so forth, context. Then comes a crisis of faith, which shakes the mind out of this naive position and transfers it to a more critical one. Its illusions are exposed as illusions. The mind, however, does not always persist in this critical position. From this position, it may return to the naive position. It wants to believe otherwise than it has recognized, and, in a moment of informed naivety, it throws cynicism to the wind and believes.
With this, an outline of a Norinagism with Berkeleian realist and Marxist characteristics is complete. The mind encounters its own feelings in moral judgments and actions informed by the speech and writing of the other. These moral judgments and actions are the mind’s context, where it encounters everything. It is a linguistic, cultural, historical, ideological, and so forth, context. It is shaped by exchanges between and within nations. The mind, however, is not always embedded in this context. It leaps into it, by bringing its commodity into exchange with the other. Its leap is a precarious one. It is never guaranteed to find its mark, and when it misses its mark, the mind does not enter into this context. Finally, the mind may not recognize that it encounters everything in a context at all, and attributes to everything it encounters absolute, mind-independent reality. After it has recognized that it encounters everything in a context, it may, still, want to believe otherwise, and, in a moment of informed naivety, it, does. For brevity’s sake, as a joke, I would like to call this Norinagism Awareanalysis.
All references to Berkeley, Norinaga, and Marx aside, I am proposing, here, a model of the human mind where a quaternity of exchange,34placeholder discourse, morality, and feelings is at work.35placeholder Exchange determines what discourse of the other informs the mind’s moral judgments and actions towards its feelings, or, more precisely, its desires and emotions. The workings of this quaternity, I also hold, are not something the mind is always conscious of. When the mind regards its objects as mere objective reality, it overlooks this quaternity.
Works Cited
Berkeley, George. “De Motu”. In The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne Volume 4, 11-53. Edited by A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948-1957.
— . “Siris: A Chan of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries”. In The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne Volume 5, 27-165. Edited by A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948-1957.
Graeber, David. “On the moral grounds of economic relations: a Maussian approach”. Journal of Classical Sociology, vol. 14, issue 1 (2014): 65-77.
Higashi, Yoriko. Norinaga shingaku no kakōsareta kamiyo no kōzō. Tokyo: Perikansha, 1999.
Karatani, Kojin. Transcritique on Kant and Marx. Translated by Sabu Kohso. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003.
— . Structure of World History: from modes of production to modes of exchange. Translated by Michael K. Bourdaghs. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014.
Kobayashi, Hideo. Motoori Norinaga (ka). Tokyo: Shinchosa, 1992. Kindle.
Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1887. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/index.htm/.
Motoori Norinaga, An anthology of kokugaku scholars, 1690-1868. Translated by John Bentley. Cornell University East Asian Program, 2017.
— . Kokun Kojiki-den 1. Nihon meicho kankō-kai, 1930.
— , Motoori Norinaga. Edited by Yoshikawa Kōjirō, Satake Akihiro, and Hino Tatsuo. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988.
— . Motoori Norinaga shū. Edited by Hino Tatsuo. Tokyo: Shinchosa, 2003.
— . The Poetics of Motoori Norinaga: a hermeneutical journey. Translated by Michael Marra. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007.
— . “Uiyamabumi”. Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 42, no. 4 (1987): 456-493.
Pearce, Kenneth. Language and the Structure of Berkeley’s World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Sagara, Tōru. Motoori Norinaga. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1978.
Vermeulen, Timotheus and Robin van den Akker. “Notes on metamodernism”, Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, vol. 2, issue 1 (2010): 1-14.
Aware is taken from the term mono no aware, which is sometimes translated as “the sadness of things” or “the pathos of things”. In classical Japanese, a sigh, “aah”, is sometimes written as aware. A thing which is aware is a thing which profoundly moves the heart.
Kenneth Pearce, Language and the Structure of Berkeley’s World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 104.
Pearce, (2017), 103.
Pearce, (2017), 104.
Pearce, (2017), 117.
Pearce, (2017).
George Berkeley, “De Motu” in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne Volume 4, ed. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948-1957), 34 (Section 10).
George Berkeley, “Siris: A Chan of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries” in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne Volume 5, ed. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948-1957), 120 (Section 250).
Pearce, (2017), 95.
Pearce, (2017), 93.
Pearce, (2017).
Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, “Notes on metamodernism”, Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, vol. 2, issue 1 (2010), 2.
Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, “Notes on metamodernism”, Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, vol. 2, issue 1 (2010), 5-6.
Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, “Notes on metamodernism”, Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, vol. 2, issue 1 (2010), 6.
I use “feelings” and “human feelings” here to signify both desires and emotions. Norinaga distinguished between the two in Isonokami Sasamegoto, arguing that desires were not as “deep” as emotions. At the same time, he also held that desires and emotions belong to the same category of mental contents, and are, furthermore, inseparable from one another. Kobayashi Hideo, in his monograph on Norinaga, titled Motoori Norinaga, argued that, for Norinaga, deep emotions are felt when human beings immerse themselves in things and take leave of themselves, while desires are felt when human beings assert themselves. The desiring self, Kobayashi also argued, aimed towards the objectification, rationalization, and domination of the world, seeing the world as something calculable with regard to its own will and interests. This self comes between an original, almost “presubjective”, relation human beings bear to things. It is, in this original, “presubjective” relation, that deep emotions occur. More recently, Higashi Yoriko, approaching the distinction through the Shintoist period Norinaga’s consideration of good and evil, has argued that the deep emotions are emotions which come to be from the suppression of desires, which, in general, are held to be “bad”. Concerning these desires and deep emotions, collectively referred to, here, as “feelings”, Norinaga, in his zuihitsu, Tamakatsuma, held that these “feelings” are all the magokoro of human beings, which he, in other entries in Tamakatsuma, defined as the innate and universal nature of human beings. Norinaga’s theory of magokoro occurs in the Shintoist period of his life, which is not the period we are considering here, but we may say that, as Norinaga moved from poetry and literature to Shinto, human feelings continued to have a place in his thought. Sagara Tōru has also argued that Norinaga’s theory of magokoro is a continuation of Norinaga’s theory of human feelings in his poetics period. Motoori Norinaga, Motoori Norinaga (hereafter MN), ed. Yoshikawa Kōjirō, Satake Akihiro, and Hino Tatsuo (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 25, 26, 137, and Motoori Norinaga shū (hereafter MNS), ed. Hino Tatsuo (Tokyo: Shinchosa, 2003), 422. Higashi Yoriko, Norinaga shingaku no kakōsareta kamiyo no kōzō (Tokyo: Perikansha, 1999), 169. Kobayashi Hideo, Motoori Norinaga (ka) (Tokyo: Shinchosa, 1992), Kindle. Sagara Tōru, Motoori Norinaga (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1978), 189.
I use “poetry” here to signify only a very specific kind of poetry. For Norinaga, ancient Chinese poetry was similar in spirit to traditional Japanese poetry (waka). Ancient Chinese poetry and traditional Japanese poetry are the kind of poetry I signify with “poetry” here. Motoori, MNS, 404.
Motoori, MNS, 126-127. Translation my own.
This account of the human mind, passing moral judgments over its own feelings and acting with respect to these judgments, is preserved in Norinaga’s thought in the Shintoist period as well. In Tamakatsuma, Norinaga spoke of moral judgments passed over feelings which are the magokoro, or innate nature, of human beings. He criticized the contemporary Japanese who, having passed judgments upon their magokoro, choose to pretend as if they did not feel those feelings they have judged to be bad, and express only those feelings they did not judge to be bad. Motoori, MN, 137.
Motoori, MNS, 87-88. Translation my own.
In the first volume of his Kojiki-den, Norinaga argued that Chinese writings were introduced into Japan from Korea in the late 3rd century, after the subjugation of the kingdoms of Korea by Empress Jingū. Historically, there has, indeed, been traffic between Japan and Korea as early back as the 3rd century. Motoori Norinaga, Kokun Kojiki-den 1 (hereafter Kojiki-den 1), (Nihon meicho kankō-kai, 1930), 18.
Monogatari such as the Tales of Genji is another source. In Shibun Yōryō, Norinaga argued the Tales of Genji was written to “have readers know mono no aware”. Norinaga attributed the same use to poetry. Later on, in Shibun Yōryō, Norinaga also remarked that “to be in conformity to human feelings does not mean acting as one wishes”. Sagara Tōru, in his monograph on Norinaga, titled Motoori Norinaga, took this remark as a hint and argued that, on the level of human relations and as a way of life, “knowing mono no aware” means, for Norinaga, being deeply moved by things but not acting upon one’s feelings, being considerate towards others and obeying the customs of the time. In other words, it is a way of life which constantly regulates one’s own feelings, and the actions following from them, for the sake of others and in conformity to customs. Monogatari is the writing of the other which allows for the attainment of this way of life. Motoori, MNS, 62, 84, 443. Sagara, 90.
Motoori, MNS, 444. Translation my own.
This kind of knowledge, and the speculations it enables, Norinaga has argued, is important for the rulers of a nation, since the rulers of a nation must know well the temperaments of the ruled. Between people of different standings, in general, too, Norinaga has argued, a lack of knowledge of the temperaments of others leads to a lack of consideration between them. Ibid., 443-445.
Motoori Norinaga, Motoori Norinaga: the Poetics of Motoori Norinaga; a Hermeneutical Journey, trans. Michael Marra (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), 197.
In the Shintoist period, in the seventh volume of the Kojiki-den, Norinaga took up the position that human beings, and the kami, by virtue of the spirit of Musubi no Kami, innately know good from evil, aim towards goodness, and despise and avoid evil. In other words, human beings as well as the kami perform moral judgments and actions spontaneously, without being taught to do so. Having said so, in Tamakatsuma, Norinaga also argued that the Japanese people have lost their magokoro, or innate nature, when their minds were overtaken by Chinese thought, and they can no longer know the Way of the kami, which Norinaga identified with magokoro, without study. More precisely, “study” here means studying the Kojiki and Nihonshoki. These two texts, for Norinaga, duly recorded the events of ancient Japan, from which the Way of the kami could be gleaned. Concerning these two texts, it must also be noted that Norinaga held the Kojiki to be more truthful of the two. This is so because there was no writing system in Japan until the introduction of Chinese writings into Japan, and accounts of the events of ancient Japan were, originally, passed down by word of mouth alone. These oral accounts, Norinaga held, were truthful representations of actual events, because, for Norinaga, ancient Japanese words merely named actual things in the world, without giving thought to any intellectual principle. This is opposed to Chinese words, where intellectual principles intervene between words and actual things. The Kojiki attempted to preserve faithfully, in Chinese writing, the ancient Japanese speech of the truthful oral accounts of the events of ancient Japan, while the Nihonshoki was written in the likeness of Chinese historical records. For this reason, Norinaga held the Kojiki to be the more faithful of the two. In other words, the Kojiki and Nihonshoki are speech and writing of others: the writing of others representing, faithfully or unfaithfully, the truthful speech of ancient others. Studying this speech and writing of others, for Norinaga, allows the Japanese to reacquaint themselves with the Way of the kami, and, presumably, also, their magokoro, or innate nature, which he identified with the Way of the kami, and includes innate knowledge of good and evil and dispositions towards them (as well as innate feelings. See note 15). Motoori, Kojiki-den 1, 4, 135, 344, MN, 25, and “Uiyamabumi”, Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 42, no. 4 (1987), 461.
Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1887), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch03.htm.
I follow Karatani Kōjin’s reading of Marx’s Capital that, for Marx, “[w]hether or not the commodity is valuable is determined only after the salto mortale of the exchange”, that is, after the commodity has been, successfully, exchanged for the other’s commodity. “Commodity may be seen as a synthesis of use-value and exchange-value only inasmuch as seen from the ex post facto stance”, that is, after exchange has, successfully, occurred. Karatani Kojin, Transcritique on Kant and Marx (hereafter Transcritique), trans. Sabu Kohso (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003), 190.
Motoori Norinaga, An anthology of kokugaku scholars, 1690-1868, trans. John Bentley (Cornell University East Asian Program, 2017), 210-211.
Exchange here can be swapped out for economic relations, such as the three relations proposed by David Graeber (baseline communism, exchange, and hierarchy). Exchanges may also be understood in terms of the four modes of exchange proposed by Karatani Kōjin (reciprocity, plunder and redistribution, commodity exchange, and association). Both Graeber and Karatani argued, too, that the subjective dimensions of human existence are shaped by economic relations and modes of exchange. Graeber held that each economic relation implies a different conception of the meaning of life. Karatani held that emotions are produced by the mode of exchange. David Graeber, “On the moral grounds of economic relations: a Maussian approach”, Journal of Classical Sociology, vol. 14, issue 1 (2014), 67, 69, 70-71, 73-74. Karatani Kojin, Structure of World History: from modes of production to modes of exchange, trans. Michael K. Bourdaghs (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014), 5-9, and Transcritique, 278.
With regard to the legitimacy of this model, and, indeed, any model, I assume a “functionalist” position, in the sense that, for me, whether a model accurately represents the actual workings of the human mind is of far less significance than whether the model “works”. The model I proposed here, then, may, I think, be seen as one of many models, all of which have their uses. With regard to Berkeleian idealism, I assume a similar position: indeed, I am not a Berkeleian idealist who thinks there is nothing in the universe but minds and ideas. Rather, I see Berkeleian idealism as a powerful tool to induce self-reflection, by dissolving every claim to objective reality and driving the subject inwards.