Welcome to the World|ω･`)! Berkeley’s Idealism, Anachronistically, “Dialectically”
George Berkeley, as a philosopher, is best remembered for his rejection of the existence of absolute, mind-independent, or, more colloquially, “objective” reality. His philosophy is an “immaterialist” philosophy which, for the best of his efforts defending it as a philosophy amicable to the common sense of the “illiterate bulk of mankind,”1placeholder remains as offensive to our common sense today as it was to the common sense of Samuel Johnson (who famously kicked a stone to “refute” Berkeley’s “immaterialism”) and other contemporaries of his over three centuries ago. This offense to our common sense, I have always found, is his most important legacy.
Berkeley’s “Dialectic”
Berkeley, allegedly, had a “master argument” against the existence of absolute, mind-independent, or “objective” reality. One form of this “master argument” is, allegedly, found in Section 23 of Part 1 of his Principles of Human Knowledge.2placeholder The section is as follows,
“But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.”3placeholder
This section and the argument presented in it were, obviously, intended as a defense for Berkeley’s idealist philosophy. As the argument presented in it is also, allegedly, Berkeley’s “master argument”, we may say that this section and “master argument” form a veritable center of Berkeley’s idealist philosophy. It seems to me, however, that an alternative reading of this section can also be attempted, which does not read this section and “master argument” as a defense for Berkeley’s idealist philosophy, but as presenting a “dialectical” development of naïve realism.4placeholder
The key to this reading is the word, “deluded”. The center of this reading is Berkeley’s diagnosis of the naïve realism of his imagined opponent as a “deluded” position (“the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind”). This diagnosis seems to have been made as Berkeley considered how his imagined opponent could come to the conclusion that they have conceived the existence of objects independent of the mental activities of minds (“surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them”), when, manifestly, from his own idealist position, the existence of such objects should have been inconceivable (“it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy”). Berkeley concluded that his imagined opponent must have omitted to frame a notion of themselves as the subject who perceived, remembered, imagined, and, in general, engaged in mental activities with regard to the, allegedly, mind-independent objects (“what is all this…more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them”). They must have failed to notice themselves engaging in these mental activities (“the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind”). This omission or failure was, in other words, determined as the condition of possibility of the naïve realism of Berkeley’s imagined opponent.
This diagnosis is “dialectical”. Naïve realism and Berkeleian idealism confront one another in this diagnosis as contradictories. Berkeley could have dismissed naïve realism, simply, as a false position and be done with it, but he did not. Rather, he attempted to account for naïve realism from his idealist position. The result is the “discovery” of a constitutive negativity within naïve realism, an “unconscious” which founded and preserves naïve realism.
What we have with this diagnosis is a contradiction and a determination. First, we have the contradiction between naïve realism and Berkeleian idealism. Second, we have the determination of naïve realism as a position constituted by our unconsciousness of the mental activities we engaged in with regard to the, allegedly, mind-independent objects.
We may further add that what occurs in the contradiction between naïve realism and Berkeleian idealism, more than the contradiction, is also an advent of an unbearable doppelganger of ourselves. As we stand in the position of naïve realism, we frame a notion of ourselves as a subject who can and have conceived the existence of objects independent of the mental activities of minds, and who, also, engages in various activities, both mental and physical, with regard to these objects. As we continue to the position of Berkeleian idealism, we frame another notion of ourselves as a subject who regards these same objects as only the objects of our perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth. These two notions and subjects are unbearable to one another. They cannot admit the other into themselves without destroying themselves. In the contradiction between naïve realism and Berkeleian idealism, an unbearable doppelganger (the subject of Berkeleian idealism) of ourselves (the subject of naïve realism) came to the fore.
In the contradiction between naïve realism and Berkeleian idealism, we also withdraw from the external world (in the sense of a world of objects existing independently of the mental activities of minds) and its plethora of mind-independent objects into ourselves. This withdrawal is not a simple withdrawal which withdraws from the external world into an internal world of imagination, preserving still, for us, the distinction between an internal and external world. Rather, this withdrawal is more radical and suspends the distinction between an internal and external world. It changes, for us, the ontological status of the external world, strips it of its externality to minds, and collapses it into a world of perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth.
We may also add that the determination which occurs after the contradiction between naïve realism and Berkeleian idealism is not any determination, but a retroactive determination. It determines the condition of possibility of naïve realism, after it has passed through its contradiction with Berkeleian idealism. It also determines our self-consciousness of when we, previously, stood in the position of naïve realism as an incomplete self-consciousness. Some of our mental activities eluded us. The external world and its plethora of mind-independent objects are also determined as delusions, which, like screens, blocked the mental activities of which they were objects from view. They are determined as obstacles to our bringing these mental activities into consciousness and achieving a complete self-consciousness, which were overcome only by the advent of our unbearable doppelganger and by our withdrawal from the external world and mind-independent objects into ourselves.
Retroactive determination also determines the contradiction between naïve realism and Berkeleian idealism as the “moment of truth”. It is determined as the moment the truth of naïve realism came to the fore, debunking the external world and its plethora of mind-independent objects as, respectively, a world of perceptions, imaginations, remembrances, and so forth, and the objects of these perceptions, imaginations, remembrances, and so forth. It is also determined as the moment our own truth came to the fore and destroyed the delusion which was founded and preserved by the effacement of this truth, that is to say, it is determined as the moment the mental activities which eluded us in naïve realism, whose unconsciousness has been determined to constitute naïve realism, came to the fore and destroyed the delusion of the external world and its plethora of mind-independent objects. It is also determined as the moment our “true self” came to the fore from behind the “false,” when the subject of Berkeleian idealism, bearing the mental activities which eluded us in naïve realism as their own, came to the fore and destroyed the subject of naïve realism, which remained in delusion.
Truth Is Destructive
Retroactive determination “discovers” an element within naïve realism, whose effacement constituted naïve realism and whose revelation destroyed it. This element is the truth of naïve realism and the truth of ourselves as we stood in the position of naïve realism. This “discovery” is, effectively, also the “discovery” of naïve realism’s potential for its own destruction. This potential has remained dormant until the advent of its and our truth. When the external world was debunked as a world of perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth, the mental activities we were unconscious of in naïve realism presented themselves to consciousness, and an unbearable doppelganger of ourselves arrived, bearing these mental activities as their own, naïve realism was destroyed. Its potential for its own destruction, on the revelation of its and our effaced truth, was actualized.
Truth Always Arrives Too Late
The truth we realize of naïve realism and ourselves as we stood in the position of naïve realism is always the truth of a past position of ours and ourselves as we stood in this past position. This truth cannot be realized within naïve realism. Its effacement is the condition of possibility of naïve realism, and, as soon as its effacement ceases, naïve realism ceases also. Therefore, we can only ever realize this truth “too late”. It is the truth we did not know, and, by the time we knew, that of which it is the truth has already been destroyed.
The World Begins Again After Withdrawal
As we withdraw from the external world into ourselves and strip the external world of its externality to minds, especially our own, the external world collapses into a world of perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth, but this world is not a world where we achieve omnipotence. As soon as we pass into this world, we are confronted with the limits of our abilities. In Sections 28 and 29 of Part 1 of Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley observed,
“I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy: and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes way for another…But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them”.5placeholder
From the limits of our abilities, we establish the existence of the other. The world begins again proper after our withdrawal. The world of perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth, is established as a world I inhabit with the other who produces the objects I perceive.
The World of Mind and Matter, and the World of Mind without Matter
The world of perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth, we pass into as we withdraw from the external world into ourselves is distinguished from the external world by the lack of any absolute, mind-independent, or “objective” reality in the former, and the abundance of such reality in the latter. In the world of perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth, esse is percipi causari. Every object is perceived by us and produced by either us or the other. Nothing simply is, much less moves and develops spontaneously, irrespective of us and the other. An immense responsibility is, therefore, also thrust upon us and the other, which was never thrust upon us and the other in the external world. In the external world, absolute, mind-independent, or “objective” reality has relieved us of this responsibility, but, as this reality loses its externality to minds, this responsibility is also thrust upon us. “Things simply happen,” “It is only natural,” and such like excuses no longer hold in the world of perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth. Everything that is is our and the other’s responsibility.
The Outside Is Mine, My Abyss
The contradiction between naïve realism and Berkeleian idealism is, originally, a contradiction between two positions outside of one another. “Outside” here means that nothing of one position can be admitted into the other position without destroying the other position. This externality to one another, however, is undone by retroactive determination, which shifts this contradiction into naïve realism as its constitutive negativity, as it determines what came to the fore in Berkeleian idealism as the truth of naïve realism which naïve realism cannot admit, whose unadmittedness founded and preserved naïve realism.
Into the Abyss of My Past
In the “dialectical” development of naïve realism, Berkeleian idealism is neither a standalone position nor a position which speaks in the present tense. Rather, it is a retrospective position which, reflecting on a past position of ours, naïve realism, also negates it. Retroactive determination also determines this reflection and negation as a movement where we threw ourselves into the nothingness which founded and preserved naïve realism and, as we and naïve realism were torn to shreds, the truth of ourselves and naïve realism also came to the fore.
The World|ω･`), Objects|ω･`), and Realism|ω･`)
In the “dialectical” development of naïve realism, Berkeleian idealism is the position where we achieve a complete self-consciousness. The movement from naïve realism to Berkeleian idealism is the movement where we advance from the incomplete self-consciousness of when we stood in the position of naïve realism to a complete self-consciousness in Berkeleian idealism. This movement, however, is also retroactively determined as a movement which penetrates into naïve realism from behind which the mental activities we were unconscious of and the subject of Berkeleian idealism, bearing these mental activities as their own, already seemed to peer at us, and came, properly, to the fore when we withdrew from the external world into ourselves and collapsed the external world into a world of percipi causari. Hence, if we are tired of nothingness, abysses, and black holes, we may refer to the external world as the world|ω･`), its plethora of mind-independent objects as objects|ω･`), and naïve realism as realism|ω･`).
( *¯ ꒳¯*)
As we withdraw from the external world and its plethora of mind-independent objects into ourselves, the mental activities we were unconscious of and the subject of Berkeleian idealism, which bears these mental activities as their own, come to the fore from behind the world|ω･`), objects|ω･`), and realism|ω･`). We may refer to the advent of these mental activities and this subject of Berkeleian idealism as ( *¯ ꒳¯*).
Welcome to the World|ω･`)!
The world|ω･`) is where neither completeness nor truth is to be found. A complete self-consciousness is achieved, and the truth of ourselves as we stand in the position of realism|ω･`), which is also the truth of realism|ω･`), is realized only in the madness which withdraws from the world|ω･`) into ourselves and reduces every object|ω･`) to percipi causari. An object|ω･`), like the world|ω･`) and realism|ω･`), is a delusion which, like a screen, blocks from view some of our mental activities. When we are moved by objects|ω･`), desire objects|ω･`), sell objects|ω･`), buy and consume objects|ω･`), and, in general, engage in various activities, both mental and physical, with regard to objects|ω･`), we are removed from completeness and truth. Not one object|ω･`) could deliver us to ( *¯ ꒳¯*), completeness, and truth except through its reduction to percipi causari. More generally put, in every relation of ours to the “objective”, we are unconscious of some of our mental activities. When this unconsciousness ceases, our relations to the “objective”, or, rather, our miscognition of our relations to percipi causari as such, ceases also. On these cessations, we are confronted with a completeness and truth which violently wrench us from the external world and its plethora of mind-independent objects, and throw us into a world of perceptions, remembrances, imaginations, and so forth. Completeness and truth are unbearable. ( *¯ ꒳¯*) is madness.
Works Cited
Berkeley, George. “A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge”. In The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne Volume 2, 1-115. Edited by A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948-1957.
Gallois, Andre. “Berkeley’s Master Argument”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, no. 1 (Jan 1974), 55-69.
Berkeley, 26 (Introduction, section 1).
Andre Gallois, “Berkeley’s Master Argument”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, no. 1 (Jan 1974), 58.
Berkeley, 51-52 (Part 1, section 23).
This reading of Berkeley is indebted to Slavoj Žižek’s discussions of Cartesian doubt, and his, Todd McGowan, and others’ discussions of retroactivity in Hegel and Freud.
Berkeley, 54 (Part 1, Sections 28 and 29).