Once again, the world witnesses the rise of fascism, fascism not as a specific name for a particular movement in one place, but rather as a worldwide reaction to the failure of the economic apparatus and the market’s inability to address substantive inequality. At this critical juncture, a moment where the vitality of the world’s cultural landscape – and by extension, its democratic potential – I asked myself why I do theatre and why it demands not merely our attention but our decisive action. This paper represents a framework, a list of ideas and principles that guide my work.
As a theatre artist, I primarily focus on theatre, although all art forms have to ask the same questions. When we compel our cultural creators to prioritize commercial viability over critical exploration, we foster a “theatre of comfort” – art that may soothe and sell well but ultimately silences critical discourse, leading to societal passivity and a vulnerability to regressive ideologies – perfect conditions for fascism to grow.
I am researching an approach, which I have called “The Theatre of Confusion,” that aims to reveal the confusion within societal structures by depicting it on stage and having the characters question themselves on a fundamental level regarding their roles and their relationship to that structure. It challenges us to examine who truly benefits from our current systems and who remains excluded from them. To practice theatre of confusion, one has to assert the moral worth of every person, no matter who they are – a radical position in a society that routinely devalues certain lives.
The historical relationship between theatre and politics has been extensively documented, from the civic function of Ancient Greek tragedy to Brecht’s epic theatre. However, the contemporary moment presents distinctive challenges that demand rethinking the theoretical frameworks and practical approaches. This requires not only a critique of existing institutional structures but also a positive articulation of theatre’s potential to disrupt dominant modes of perception and cognition that sustain exploitation. The stakes of this inquiry extend far beyond the realm of aesthetics, touching on fundamental questions of class consciousness, collective agency, and the possibility of transformation in an age of profound alienation.
To do so, I offer to embrace confusion not as an endpoint but as a catalyst. I see theatre, in Brecht’s spirit, that becomes a “club for lovers of dialectics” and praxis, a space for robust inquiry and audience activation. This “theatre of confusion” recognizes its capacity to be the site of the idea’s living appearance, where the often-elusive relationship between immediate experiences and overarching truths of exploitation can be grasped from the perspective of the encounter.
This reflection captures my tentative understanding of what it means to encourage active participation and critical intellectual reflection from spectators. I have noted a few observations while reading critical theory. First, to understand the world, to be able to think the real, there is a need for the other. Second, there is no consensus on what thought actually is, but most scholars agree that thought exists and is always preceded by a feeling. Therefore, the active participation of the spectator involves an encounter and an emotional experience. This chain consists of emotion, confusion and thought, as part of the encounter between theatre and spectator. To illustrate this, I will compare the structure of the theatre of confusion with Aristotle’s Poetics and Brechtian Epic Theatre, while engaging with critical theory.
The philosophical foundations of the theatre of confusion can be examined through the relation of contingency and necessity. The inseparability of act and content means we always deal with the given. Nothing exists that cannot be a relation to the world. The confusion of the relation to the world always creates an emotional response in the spectator. And there, where once was an emotion, it will always be followed by a thought. Thought must exist, and we cannot escape it, but we can transform it through praxis. No matter how much the theatre of comfort tries to push us in the opposite direction. During an encounter with someone else, desires become entangled, and thoughts begin to merge. This interaction is always a potential event, where one thought it was “I,” but in fact, it is already “other.”
In Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel states that the initial entity to self-posit is not the subject of consciousness but rather ‘the Concept’, the subject as a pure Self of thought or being. Initially, Hegel does not clarify the nature of thought and how to comprehend it. However, when given a thought to think, one naturally shifts into the act of thinking. Even if given something unthinkable, one concludes from their failure to think that the concept is unthought. Thinking can be a repetitive cycle, but considering it as a single thought can lead to a new operation. After all, a good repetition is a good repetition. This is how I see thought, in a Hegelian manner: thought is a pure self-activity as such.
The solution, which provides a philosophical grounding for theatre of confusion, lies in finding, within the opposition to absolutization itself, a verifiably absolute being – facticity. The establishment of contingency is the groundless ground itself – the confusion. This confusion has an absolute ontological property – the form or schema of contingency that is always preceded and followed by a necessity. This philosophical position encapsulates the aims of the theatre of confusion. By embracing contingency as an absolute property rather than a limitation, theatre of confusion acknowledges the groundlessness of being while simultaneously affirming the possibility of truth-events emerging from this very groundlessness. The theatrical event becomes a space where the contingent nature of market arrangements can be made visible, where the absence of sufficient reason for the status quo becomes apparent, and where new possibilities can emerge precisely because nothing – including the market itself – is necessary.
The Theatre of Confusion emerges as a response to our contemporary moment, characterized by information overload and profound social fragmentation. While Aristotelian poetics sought to create order through mimesis and catharsis, and Brechtian epic theatre aimed to expose social contradictions through alienation, the Theatre of Confusion embraces the chaotic nature of contemporary existence (confusion) as a productive force. By representing confusion as confusion, it opens spaces where truth can emerge through encounter and event.
Side-by-Side Comparison
| Aristotelian Poetics | Brechtian Epic Theatre | Theatre of Confusion | |
| Narrative Structure | Linear, unified plot with beginning, middle, end | Episodic, montage-like, historically situated | Non-linear storyline, series of events extracting elements from chaos of being |
| Emotional Engagement | Aims for emotional identification leading to catharsis | Emotional distancing (Verfremdungseffekt) to enable critical thinking | Deliberate creation of emotions as catalysts for thought |
| Political Dimension | Implicit, often reinforcing existing social order | Explicit critique of capitalism and class relations | Explicit socio-political themes related to market regulations |
| Audience Relationship | Passive spectators absorbed in the illusion | Active observers encouraged to judge and analyze | Co-creators in the encounter, participants in truth-making |
| Representation of Reality | Mimetic, attempting to represent reality faithfully | Demonstrative, showing reality as changeable | Dialectical, revealing the confusion inherent in reality |
| Temporal Focus | Present action unfolding | Historical perspective, past informing present | Present moment as site of potential Event |
| Character Development | Consistent characters with clear motivations | Characters as social types and representatives of class | Characters as sites of encounter with alterity |
| Theatrical Devices | Unity of time, place, action; verisimilitude | Songs, placards, direct address; visible theatrical apparatus | Strategic disorientation; |
The Aristotelian framework rests on the belief that reality itself is coherent and that artistic representation should reflect this coherence through unity of action, time, and place. The well-made plot follows a logical sequence of causally connected events, featuring characters whose actions stem from consistent motivations. This approach assumes that truth is pre-existing and can be revealed through faithful representation.
Bertolt Brecht’s epic theatre, developed in the politically turbulent context of the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany, represented a radical departure from Aristotelian principles. Grounded in Marxist dialectical materialism, Brecht’s approach conceived of reality not as naturally ordered but as socially constructed and historically contingent. For Brecht, the purpose of theatre was not emotional catharsis but critical awakening – to make audiences aware of the social contradictions that shape their lives and to inspire them to change these conditions. By historicizing social conditions that might otherwise appear natural or inevitable, Brecht’s theatre aimed to reveal their contingency and thus their potential for transformation.
The Theatre of Confusion emerges in our contemporary era of late capitalism. Drawing on phenomenology, the ontology of alterity, and Badiou’s concept of the Event, this approach recognizes that the world itself is in a state of confusion – not ordered (as Aristotle believed) nor merely obscured by ideology (as Brecht contended), but fundamentally chaotic and contingent by necessity. The purpose of theatre, in this framework, is not to impose order or merely expose contradictions, but to embrace confusion as confusion that opens spaces where truth can emerge through encounter. A position that allows theatre to challenge political systems. This approach acknowledges that being itself is chaotic and that meaning emerges not through the representation of pre-existing truth (Aristotle) or exposure of hidden social relations (Brecht), but through the event of encounter between performer and spectator. The Theatre of Confusion recognizes that the world’s inherent disorder requires active intervention to create conditions where truth can appear, if only momentarily, in the space between self and other.
Aristotelian poetics demands a unified plot with a clear beginning, middle, and end, where each event follows causally from what precedes it. This approach reflects Aristotle’s belief in an ordered cosmos where events unfold according to logical necessity or probability. The well-made Aristotelian plot creates a sense of inevitability, with the conclusion appearing as the necessary outcome of the initial situation.
Brechtian epic theatre deliberately fractures this unity, employing an episodic, montage-like structure that emphasizes discontinuity rather than continuity. Each scene stands independently, connected not by causal necessity but by thematic or dialectical relationships. This approach reflects Brecht’s historical materialist understanding that social reality is full of contradictions and ruptures. By interrupting the narrative flow, Brecht prevents audiences from being swept along by the story and encourages them to critically examine each situation.
The Theatre of Confusion pushes this fragmentation further, but keeps the non-linear storyline, recognizing that in our modern world, experience itself is often fragmented, discontinuous, and resistant to simple causal explanations. If it cannot be explained through words, it can be staged so the audience can feel it.
Perhaps the most distinct difference between these three approaches lies in their treatment of emotion. Aristotelian poetics aims for emotional identification leading to catharsis – the audience should feel with the characters, experiencing pity and fear that is ultimately purged through the resolution of the drama. This emotional journey is understood as both pleasurable and edifying, aligning the spectator’s feelings with the moral order of the universe.
Brechtian epic theatre explicitly rejects this emotional identification in favour of critical distance. Through the alienation effect (Verfremdungseffekt), Brecht prevents audiences from becoming emotionally absorbed in the drama, instead encouraging them to observe and judge the characters and situations from an intellectual perspective. Emotion is not eliminated but redirected toward social conditions rather than individual fates.
The Theatre of Confusion transcends this dichotomy by recognizing that emotion and thought are not opposed but interconnected. It deliberately creates emotions as catalysts for thought, understanding that after emotion always already emerges a thought. Rather than choosing between emotional identification (Aristotle) and critical distance (Brecht), it harnesses the power of emotion to stimulate reflection. This approach acknowledges the embodied nature of cognition – that thinking is not separate from feeling but emerges through and with emotional experience.
The political dimensions of the theatrical paradigms reflect their historical contexts and philosophical foundations. Aristotelian poetics contains an implicit politics that tends toward the conservation of the existing social order. By presenting human experiences and moral dilemmas within a framework of cosmic order, it naturalizes social arrangements and focuses on individual ethical choices rather than systemic critique.
Brechtian epic theatre makes its politics explicit, offering a Marxist critique of capitalism and class relations. By demonstrating how social conditions shape individual lives and by historicizing what might otherwise appear natural, it denaturalizes the status quo and suggests the possibility of revolutionary change. The political message is not hidden but foregrounded as the primary purpose of theatrical representation.
The Theatre of Confusion maintains Brecht’s explicit focus on socio-political themes related to class struggle but situates these within a phenomenological framework. It recognizes that political consciousness emerges not just through intellectual understanding of social contradictions but through embodied encounters with alterity. By creating spaces where the contingency of social arrangements becomes viscerally apparent, it opens possibilities for reimagining political relations at an ontological level.
The concept of confusion warrants careful consideration within critical theory. I do not advocate for obscurantism or willful incomprehensibility, but rather for a strategic deployment of disorientation that reveals the contingency of established perceptual and cognitive frameworks that sustain market hegemony. This approach has historical precedents in various avant-garde movements, from Dadaism to the agitprop theatre of the early Soviet period, but differs in its explicit orientation toward contemporary class struggle. The confusion I advocate is not nihilistic but dialectical – it aims to negate existing certainties to create the conditions for new, world-shattering understandings to emerge. It is the confusion as confusion, where it becomes the crack in reality, a place for the emergence of truth.
In these disorienting times, theatre’s first mission, as Badiou (2013) insists, is to show the confusion as confusion – to reveal the contradictions inherent in the current system. This is not about adding to the noise, but about meticulously stylizing and amplifying our current societal disorientation until its uninhabitability becomes starkly obvious. Yet even within this representation of apparent desperation, the theatre of confusion strives to make previously unseen possibilities for change to emerge.
My core theoretical position is this: the power of theatre, at its most potent, emerges as an encounter between the performance and the spectator. Following Fischer-Lichte (2008), I understand this as a transformative experience where the boundaries between performer and spectator blur, where language, body, and expression intertwine to challenge categorical thinking and existing structures. This encounter, as Féral (2002) notes, constitutes the very essence of theatricality – a dynamic process of looking and being looked at, an ethically and politically bonded coming-together in a space where sensory signs meet truth-making processes.
Unlike the passive consumption model that dominates mainstream entertainment of the theatre of comfort, the theatrical encounter, within the theatre of confusion, involves a fundamental co-presence and co-responsibility between performers and spectators. This co-presence is not merely physical but constitutes what is visible, sayable, and thinkable within a given space. The theatrical encounter thus has the potential to redistribute these sensory coordinates, opening up new perceptual and cognitive possibilities that challenge hegemony. Within this charged interaction, the performative act unfolds as political praxis. This is not merely representation; it is, as Lehmann (2006) suggests, an action that transcends cultural sanction, restructuring behaviour and generating new social and aesthetic perceptions that serve the interests of the people. The performative act is intrinsically linked to the unrepeatable present moment of performance – a choice to act in this present, connected to our being yet striving to transcend it and the market relations that constrain it. The actor experiences and enacts each beat of the performance, perceiving, addressing, feeling, and imagining, while the spectator observes these processes, forming an embodied understanding of class relations and a potential change.
The character on stage, much like our own selves, is never entirely known to the performer, who unconsciously seeks wholeness through desires and actions that can only be completed by the spectator’s perception – herein lies its political potential. This incompleteness is not a deficiency but precisely the condition of possibility for genuine solidarity. As Marx recognized long before, the subject is fundamentally constituted through its relations with others and its position within the relations of production. Theatrical performance ought to make this relationality explicit, turning it into a site of potential connection, transformation, and class consciousness formation.
The theatrical encounter fundamentally involves what we might call the ontology of alterity – the philosophical condition of otherness that makes the theatrical event possible. The gaze of the other compels us to examine our fidelity to being and our position within societal relations. In the theatrical space, the other emerges not as a separate entity but from our own side; to arrive at the world of the performance, we rely on our external self and all other externalities, including our material conditions. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, consciousness appropriates being, thereby distorting it. To truly engage with theatrical truth, one must allow the gaze to become part of the world, the reverse side of oneself.
As I (2024) have argued, with the performer and the spectator in the theatrical space, who inhabit their own world, as the other, each is occupying the lacunae of that world. The one’s gaze extracts the other from oneself, possessing an alienating power precisely because one alienates oneself from oneself in the act of perception. This encounter actualizes what was already latent and possible within one – class consciousness. Reconciliation with one’s body and existence becomes possible through the other, who confirms one’s embeddedness in being and potential for collective action. This is precisely why theatre of confusion holds such transformative potential – it creates the conditions for this ontological encounter to occur with heightened intensity, breaking through the mystifications of ideology.
The spectator can penetrate the universe of the character on stage only through rupture, as pain and catastrophe, the disruptive aims of the theatre of confusion. As Merleau-Ponty states, the other must be my Negation or my destruction. The other is merely one’s perceived being, simultaneously an ontological connection and a relation of pure negation. The other decenters one; the spectator and the performer are two paths to the same being. The other makes present what remains inaccessible to the other from the other’s perspective.
In our reflection on the world, there exists a blind spot – an invisible state of proximity with the world. The other allows us, to some degree, to recognize this invisible state, to draw closer to the living life of the world through their expressions of it; this is precisely how a performer communicates with a spectator, revealing the hidden structures that ideology conceals. The a priori is ipso facto unreal – a surface concealing the fabric of the world in which we are entangled – and the position of the other helps reveal it. Thus, being exists between one and the other, both individual (as corporeal, living, vital) and universal (as pure), mediated by our positions within the structure.
Such are the realities of interaction between the spectator and the performer in the theatrical space: the spectator realizes the performer’s intentions while remaining anonymous and expressing pure difference–distant yet close, empathetic yet shocking, exceeding any conception one might have of them as a living system of experience, suffering, and positions. This ontological framework provides a deeper philosophical grounding for understanding why theatre of confusion, with its deliberate disruption of comfortable certainties, creates the conditions for transformation.
When this encounter achieves critical intensity, it can ignite what Badiou (2007) terms an Event–a rupture in the ordinary that allows truth to emerge, empowering the subject to assert a new understanding, a luminous law. For Badiou, the Event is not simply a happening, but a radical break in the situation (or status quo) that reveals something previously invisible or unthinkable. In the context of the theatre of confusion, this means that a performance can potentially disrupt the dominant symbolic order, creating a space for new forms of subjectivity to emerge.
The relationship between performance and audience differs significantly across these three paradigms. In Aristotelian poetics, spectators are positioned as passive recipients. They are absorbed in the theatrical illusion, identifying with characters and experiencing catharsis through their vicarious journey. The audience’s role is to receive the performance rather than to question or co-create it.
Brechtian epic theatre transforms spectators into active observers, encouraged to judge and analyze what they see. By breaking the fourth wall, using direct address, and exposing theatrical conventions, Brecht prevents passive absorption and demands intellectual engagement. The audience is positioned as a collective of critical thinkers rather than emotional participants.
The Theatre of Confusion goes further by positioning spectators as co-creators within the encounter, active participants in truth-making. Drawing on the ontology of alterity, it recognizes that meaning emerges in the space between performer and spectator, with each completing what the other begins. The audience is neither passively receiving nor critically observing but actively participating in the creation of meaning through their presence.
Despite their differences, these three theatrical paradigms share certain fundamental concerns. All are concerned with truth, though they conceptualize it differently: Aristotle sees truth as universal human experience revealed through mimesis; Brecht understands truth as social and historical reality obscured by ideology; and I conceive it as fragmented and emerging through the encounter, even if only momentarily, in the space between self and other.
All three approaches also believe in theatre’s transformative potential, though the nature of this transformation varies: Aristotle seeks emotional and moral transformation through catharsis; Brecht aims for political transformation through critical awareness; and the Theatre of Confusion works toward ontological transformation through the encounter with alterity.
Each paradigm also offers a structured approach to theatrical creation, providing systematic theories about how theatre functions: Aristotle identifies six elements of tragedy (plot, character, thought, diction, melody, spectacle); Brecht develops techniques of alienation and historicization; and the Theatre of Confusion employs a series of events creating a deliberate confusing universe that aim to evoke emotional catalysts for thought.
Finally, all three position theatre in relation to broader society, though with different emphases: Aristotle sees theatre as a reflection of social order and a form of moral education; Brecht conceives of theatre as a tool for social critique and change; and the Theatre of Confusion understands theatre as a tool for reconciliation with the confusion amid societal structures.
The Theatre of Confusion has several principles as theatrical theory and practice that distinguish it from both Aristotelian poetics and Brechtian epic theatre. First, it takes an ontological approach to confusion that differs from its predecessors. While Aristotle sought clarity and Brecht sought critical distance, the Theatre of Confusion embraces confusion as a positive force. It recognizes that the world itself is in confusion and proposes that only by engaging with this confusion dialectically can truth emerge.
Second, it aims for an integration of emotion and thought that transcends the Aristotelian/Brechtian dichotomy. Where Aristotle emphasized emotional identification and Brecht emotional distancing, the Theatre of Confusion recognizes that after emotion always already emerges a thought. This insight integrates the emotional power of Aristotelian drama with the critical aims of Brechtian theatre, acknowledging that thinking and feeling are not opposed but interconnected aspects of human experience.
Third, its emphasis on theatre as a phenomenological encounter between performer and spectator provides a philosophical departure from either Aristotle’s mimesis or Brecht’s alienation effect. This encounter becomes the site where truth can emerge through the recognition of the other, acknowledging that meaning is not pre-existing (Aristotle) or hidden (Brecht) but created in the space between self and other.
Fourth, drawing on Badiou’s concept of the Event, the Theatre of Confusion positions theatrical performance as a potential rupture in ordinary reality. It proposes a more radical transformation of consciousness – one that occurs not through representation or demonstration but through the event of encounter itself.
Fifth, its methodology of extracting elements of the chaos of being to create the universe of the play works with the inherent confusion of reality to reveal its underlying patterns, acknowledging that in our contemporary world, experience itself is often fragmented and discontinuous, rather than imposing order (Aristotle) or demonstrating social contradictions (Brecht).
Sixth, the Theatre of Confusion positions itself as asking the question to initiate the dialectical process. While Brecht used dialectics to demonstrate contradictions, the Theatre of Confusion is less focused on the contradiction and more on the dialectical movement itself. This approach recognizes that truth emerges not through answers but through the process of questioning itself.
The Theatre of Confusion, from Aristotle, retains the power of emotional engagement; from Brecht, it maintains the commitment to social critique and dialectical thinking. However, it adds a dimension through its focus on the encounter, a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between emotion and thought, and a recognition of confusion itself as a productive force.
We can’t fix the world and create one with no flaws. But even if we can’t solve the human condition, we can turn the world from misery to one of ordinary joy by embracing the confusion. As Marx puts it, with our animal problems solved, we can begin to solve our human ones. The way to prevent abuses of power is to have a free civil society and robust democratic institutions. For that, we need to educate people. Culture does that.
The Theatre of Confusion thus represents not merely a new theatrical style but a reminder of the role of the theatre and a philosophical response to contemporary conditions—one that harnesses the disorienting aspects of our reality as tools for revelation rather than obstacles to understanding. In a world where traditional narratives have lost their explanatory power and where social media algorithms create personalized realities, the theatre of confusion offers a space where we can encounter otherness, question our assumptions, and perhaps glimpse truths that emerge only in the spaces between established categories and comfortable certainties.
The meaning of art is not fixed; it is co-created between the work and its witness. The true meaning of a performance doesn’t reside solely in text or directorial intention; it emerges dynamically when performer and spectator engage, when the other is acknowledged. This is not the simple transmission of meaning but a complex interplay where fixed selfhood is challenged, and we recognize that understanding is shaped through interaction and material conditions. As Žižek (2006) elaborates, the subject’s desire is always the desire of the other, implying that our most intimate experiences are fundamentally mediated through social and symbolic structures that are themselves products of class relations. Theatre makes this mediation explicit, potentially allowing for its reconfiguration.
The artist’s gesture in the theatre of confusion, much like desire itself, inherently disrupts the perceived stability of the real. This disruption creates necessary fissures through which new truths can emerge. Herein lies the profound political potential: the encounter between artwork and spectator becomes an Event capable of reconfiguring understanding and stimulating critical class consciousness. This process is not about imposing a singular doctrine; rather, it offers a pathway to collective thinking and action, fostering an understanding that truth is not absolute but forged in the dynamic interplay between artistic act and the material conditions. Each truth thus revealed forms part of a larger multitude, a rich tapestry of perspectives.
We must trust that people can help themselves and one another. The cause and the solution to all problems are the same – people. I choose a world where the free development of each individual is the foundation for the free development of all. Of course, a community-oriented society for everyone is a utopia, much like equality. Still, our moral duty is to believe in it and work towards it, rather than depending on the goodwill of the elites.
Culture, in its deepest and most challenging sense, will save the world by fostering the critical, nuanced thinking necessary to address its most urgent problems. Freedom is not a given but must be continually enacted through collective action in the public sphere. Theatre must provide a space where this enactment can be rehearsed and actualized. The theatre of confusion does not offer an escape from reality but encourages a deeper engagement with it – one that recognizes the inherent complexity and contingency of social and political life while affirming the possibility and necessity of freedom. By embracing confusion as a catalyst rather than an endpoint, we open ourselves to new truths and possibilities, creating a world where art and politics intersect in the ongoing pursuit of human liberation from modern forms of exploitation.
As Marx states in his 11th thesis, we must change the world. We need to recognize that much cannot be achieved solely through the government. We are all the state, and the state is us. Change doesn’t have to happen only from the top down, but also from the bottom up. To achieve this, we must educate people and inspire reflection on these processes – the ultimate aim of the theatre of confusion.
Works Cited
Aristotle. Poetics. Translated by S. H. Butcher, The Internet Classics Archive, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.html.
Badiou, A. (2013). In Praise of Theatre. Polity Press.
Badiou, A. (2007). Being and Event. (O. Feltham, Trans.). Continuum. (Original work published 1988).
Brecht, Bertolt. (1964). Brecht on Theatre. Edited and translated by John Willett, Hill and Wang.
Féral, J. (2002). Theatricality: The Specificity of Theatrical Language. SubStance, 31(2/3), 94-108.
Fischer-Lichte, E. (2008). The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics. Routledge.
Lehmann, H. T. (2006). Postdramatic Theatre. Routledge.
Mamal, A. (2024). The subject of politics of visibility in Jacques Rancière and Peggy Phelan. Epoche Magazine, Issue #70.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The Visible and the Invisible. Northwestern University Press.
Žižek, S. (2006). The Parallax View. MIT Press.