The functioning of the law
Doctor Subtilis’ thought surprises with its originality and is considered a forerunner of modern legislative thought. The historical idea of law that results from reading the pages of Scotus makes this author a forerunner of modern law, but his permanence and his insistence on natural law make him a scholastic thinker. He connects positive law to natural law and what today would be called human rights are formed on natural law.
For Scotus, these are prescriptive elements, they are not historically descriptive, they should be ideals to achieve. Therefore, positive law takes on importance as the guideline that directs the human traveler towards fundamental goods. In a medieval society, governed by authoritarian rulers, Scotus’ political ideal moves towards a Christian res publica. Scotus promotes popular sovereignty and places political and judicial power in the hands of the people. According to C. R. S. Harris, this way of understanding Scotus’ politics makes him deserve the title of founder of political science. According to interpreters, he laid the foundations of modern natural law and proposes a new vision of the popular body, considering it exactly the sovereign of politics through what is defined as “direct democracy”.
Scotus denotes a continuous evolution of humanity according to a sort of “law of progress” which provides for continuous achievements from a scientific, cultural, technical and philosophical point of view.
Historical investigation must deal with the fact that the reason of the human traveler is limited and imperfect. From this derives the idea that human law can never be perfect because it is created by an imperfect being: human law is affected by human imperfection and is therefore constitutionally defective. It will always have an intrinsic need for improvement and adaptation to changing history. Scotus traced a progressive line of human cultural evolution1placeholder and he considered positive law as continually changing, without hiding behind the perfection of natural law or avoiding posing the problem of the continuous change of positive law.
For natural law there are some characteristics that remain unchanged and are fundamental principles: “bonum amandum, malum fugiendum, honestatem sectandam, turpitudo odio habendam”2placeholder and of “conclusiones evidentes et necessario ex his principiis illatas”3placeholder (Ordianatio, Vol. III, d. 17, 37, 40 – Vol. IV, 40, 45, 46).
The natural law is immutable and perfect, but in order to achieve it, the human mind, which is imperfect, needs the positive law which proves to be more similar to human capabilities.
He claims that humans have often fallen into deviations, or have ignored the law, which is why the Decalogue became necessary: there was a need for positive law. To act morally, humanity needs firm and certain guidance. The Decalogue is a positive law that derives from natural law: in fact the Decalogue is given to Moses by God and therefore derives from natural law.
At this point, having established the need for positive law, we must understand its purpose:
“The purpose of the law is the ‘common good’, ‘justice’, the maintenance of internal peace, the defense of the rights and goods of citizens, the defense of the country externally from unjust aggression. The laws have a purpose, first of all, to punish crime and violence, and secondly to promote the good and progress of the country. Having the law as its primary aim the maintenance of order and the defense of the respublica, it will tend more to avoid evil than to promote ‘virtue’, although, secondarily, it must also aim at this end. With a modern view, having distinguished the ‘two powers’, Scotus maintains that the aim of ‘civil law’ is the good and progress of ‘temporal society’, which must not hinder, but favor spiritual good” (Ambrogio Manno, 1994, pp. 253-254).
Scotus says what positive law is for, explaining that human beings seek satisfaction and also punishments that are very far from the ultimate goal that humanity should pursue, God: “Sed patet, ad quid aspiciunt plus principes, quia magis ad commodum temporale quam ad honorem Dei, et per hoc plus puniunt et reprimere volunt peccata in proximum quam in Deum”4placeholder (Ordinatio, IV, d. 15, q. 3, n. 3).
There are insurmountable barriers that human beings absolutely cannot overcome: natural law and positive divine law. Positive human laws, to be considered valid, must be in agreement with natural law. The problem arises when human laws have to deal with the most disparate systems and therefore it is not possible to find a univocal guideline, Scotus tries to show the way in which human beings can overcome this problem: “Nulla nisi quae vel descendit a lege divina sicut conclusiones practicae a principiis practicis, vel quae concordat legi divinae, ad minus, quae non discordat”5placeholder (Ordinatio, IV, d. 15, q. 3, n. 7).
The divine will can freely accept as meritorious whatever it chooses, without having to keep in mind the intrinsic goodness of God.6placeholder A consequence of this conceptualization of Scotus is that there is a marked contraction of the normative system identified with the law of nature: this would seem unchangeable and of absolute value, then no law that God can change, bearing in mind that it enjoys absolute power, can be defined as natural. The laws of divine positive law do not have a necessary value, but a contingent one because they are chosen by God from an infinity of possible laws.7placeholder The laws of nature are, ultimately, laws that have a necessary nature, and not a contingent one like the previous ones, because if they were modified the very concept of God would be undermined: the laws of nature, although created by it, bind God equally. The divine precepts, transmitted by Scripture, are not laws of nature because the viator’s mind is capable of recognizing writing, but is not capable of recognizing the laws of nature. Even the divine commandments have a close relationship with natural legislation: only the first two commandments “You shall have no other God before me” and “Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain” seem to be part of the law of nature; already the third commandment, “Remember to sanctify the holidays”, which for the Jews would be the Shabbat, seems to Scotus an unlikely element regarding the formation of the law of nature because it cannot be demonstrated that the worship of God is necessary in one way rather than in another. Instead, the other precepts, those of the second table, derive from God, but are not precepts assimilable to the natural law, but to the positive divine law. The point is decisive, authority is granted, in positive law, by those who allow themselves to be governed by giving the ruler power: Scotus, in this case, is a forerunner of the English contractualists.8placeholder
Scot’s voluntarism has a fundamental importance in this case: the desire to set self-regulating norms, which sets them is the center of law in Duns Scotus:
“[T]he human will is characterized by the vast autonomy that allows it to autonomously establish the norms of social action, but at the same time by the dependence on the precepts established by the will of God which are imposed not by their natural rationality, but by force of divine decision. The comparison between the two wills remains the underlying theme of man’s moral and, now, civil rules, but this comparison guarantees man the normative space in which to regulate himself on the basis of values that he himself sets. It therefore becomes the collective responsibility of the social group to establish laws that integrate natural law and divine precepts, through a regulatory activity sufficiently autonomous to make a gap between extended natural law and positive norm possible.”9placeholder
It is necessary to mention the political question of the age of Duns Scotus to understand the correlation that exists between his conception of law and politics: Society at the time of Scotus is undergoing a complete transformation, and philosophy, especially scholastic philosophy, is affected: the empire is undergoing a disintegration, the power of national monarchies is growing disproportionately, free municipalities are increasing in number, peripheral regions are increasingly asking for greater autonomy and, finally, the Church has seen its political power diminish. In the opposite camp the idea of an equally exaggerated caesaropapism comes forward.10placeholder
Scotus maintains that civil and political authority, which takes its being from the people, is valid only within the limits and areas delineated by the people. For Scotus, the delegation of power to an external subject exists as a fundamental principle of politics, but it is not irrevocable and unconditional, as it would be in the modern age with Hobbes.11placeholder Rather, it is placed under the conditions that the people decide and delegate; in Scotus’ conception the people are always sovereign and have the possibility of doing without the ruler at any time in the event that he fails to comply with the agreements.
Law as a historical concept
At this point we should ask ourselves whether natural law has failed, whether it is contradictory or whether it is conceptually relative.
However imperfect humans are, the “truth” remains the same and does not change, and although there may be cases in which it goes against natural law, its value remains incontrovertible and indestructible.
The value of natural law must be founded, keeping in mind that according to the idea of absolute power, God could make anything be different from how it is or change it in a contingent future in a free manner, on ratio and not on praxis. Natural law remains objective at all times.
“It thus develops [natural law] that system of moral principles, as the background and foundation of law, which restore to man, to the family institution, to civil society and to the State the scope of their rights on the basis of the inalienable rights that are constitutive of man as man and of ‘human society’. At the same time he outlines that ‘pyramid of values’ which refers to God, the absolute value and value of values, and gradually glides into the various entities according to ‘the being of which they are constituted, each in its order’. The ‘ontological degrees’ are ‘degrees of values’, participating, as they are, in various orders, in the Trinity, power, wisdom, infinite goodness” (Ambrogio Manno, 1994, p. 257).
Hence the position of the human being who, through natural law, finds himself closer to the Creator. Scotus underlines the particular nature of the human being, its haecceitas: the human being is unique. Here lies the relationship between the nature of the human being and natural law: although the anthropological and sociological diversity of peoples may lead to changes, the human being and natural law will remain transparent to themselves. Human beings have never been able to enjoy natural law perfectly because they were always blinded by earthly matters. The viator man cannot arrive at an understanding of natural law, but reason in itself can arrive at a knowledge of natural law and positive law. For this reason, politics becomes important in the Scotian conception: even if the law is not recognized in a worthy manner by the finite human being, it can, in part, manage to organize a political form that can be functional to its life:
“Alia est auctoritas, non praesidentiae paternalis respectu filiorum, sed extraneorum et diversorum simul congregatorum in aliqua communitate, terra vel civitate, qua e est auctoritas habita per electionem ab illis extraneis, et potest dici auctoritas principis ad subditos. In civitate enim vel terra congregabantur primo multae gentes extraneae et diversae, quarum nulla tenebatur alteri oboedientiam, quia nullus habuit auctoritatem super alium, et tunc ex mutuo consensu omnium propter pacificam conversationem inter se habendam potuerunt eligere unum ex eis principem, qui in omnibus solum dum ille viveret, ut subditi oboedirent, vel quod sibi et suis succedentibus legitimis subessent secundum conditiones, quas vellent, sic vel sic, ut diversi modo tenent principatum, quia quidam tantum ad vitam, quidam per successionem”12placeholder (Reportata parisiensia, IV, d. 15, q. 4).
Foreigners and the general population can agree to elect a prince who will serve as their political guide. Authority therefore derives from the people themselves who grant the prince power. This should serve to avoid the system of dynastic succession in power which would be the death of politics in an elective sense.
Scotus’ intuitions in the field of law are of a very high importance because, as mentioned, he anticipates the modern age of great political theorizations. However, the question of rights is recognized by Scotus as a “must be” in the sense that legislation can never reach a desirable degree of perfection: it will always remain a conceptual paradigm to which to adhere, but, with the constitutive imperfection of human being, can never be more than this. An ideal to adhere to, which is never put into practice and which, historically, can only be used as a guide of behavior. For this reason, Scotus gives great importance to positive law, which always exists in contrast with human passions. One issue that Scotus draws attention to is that positive law must be in agreement with natural law. Positive law reaches all areas of human life, ergo it has particular and complex nuances.13placeholder Scotus poses a maxim taking murder as an example:
“Augustinus I De civitate Dei »: « His (inquit) exceptis, quos lex iusta generaliter vel Deus occidi specialiter iubet, quisquis hominem occiderit, criminis reus erit». Quae autem sit lex iusta, ipse determinat De libero arbitrio libro I, breviter: Nulla, nisi quae vel iam descendit a Lege divina (sicut conclusiones practicae a principiis practicis), vel quae concordat Legi divinae, ad minus quae non discordat. Ad propositum, Lex divina prohibet Non occides; et nulli inferiori licet in lege superioris dispensare; ergo nulla lex positiva, constituens hominem occidi, iusta est, si in illis casibus statuat in quibus Deus non excipit. Excipit autem in multis, ut patet in Ex. de blasphemo, homicida, adultero et multis aliis. Nullus ergo iuste secundum legem occidit, nisi lex positiva infligat homicidium, nec excipitur ille casus a Deo prohibente homicidium”14placeholder (Ordinatio, IV, d. 15, q. 3, n. 2).
These rules set out the nature of civil legislation; it has in the natural law and in the positive divine law two guiding tracks to follow and two bulwarks that it cannot cross, and, consequently, legislation must be an expression of rationality and justice, safeguarding and promoting the fundamental rights of citizens. Scotus calls for the prudence of the legislator and requests that he be guided by God in his work. It is not easy to navigate a maze of laws that are sometimes even in conflict with each other. Only divine help can assist the legislator in his work which has a margin of discretion.
“Onera imposita in Vetere Lege erant praecepta moralia, caerimonialia, iudicialia, ad quae omnia tenebatur tunc omnes necessario: De moralibus patet.
De caerimonialibus sic intelligendum est, quod licet sine peccato mortali possent Iudaei transgredi monitionem pertinentem ad caerimonialia (puta, sine peccato mortali possent tangere mortuum et huiusmodi multas immundiatias incurrere), tamen si non facerent illa quae in Lege continebantur, et tenebantur ad purificationem talium, peccabant mortaliter, sicut explicatur ibi: Anima quae fecerit sic et sic, morte moriatur, vel peribit de populis suis: per illud enim intelligitur comminatio damnationis aeternae.
Ad iudicilia omnia etiam tenebatur: vel per se, vel quando decebantur per iudices eorum, – vel maxime per sacerdotes levitici generis, si quando erat casus dubius apud iudices inferiores, iuxta illud Deut: ‘Omnis anima, quae contempserit iudicium sacerdotis, morte moriatur’.
In Lege autem Nova, praecepta moralia eadem sunt quae tunc, sed magis explicita; caerimonialia sunt multo pauciora et leviora, quae imposita sunt per Christum; iudicialia nulla sunt per Christum imposita, sed magis lex mititatis et humilitatis, in qua non oportet habere iudicialia, iuxta illud ad Cor.: Omnino delictum est in vobis quod iudicium habetis. Quare non magis fraudem patimini? Hoc enim Christus docuerat Matth. 5: Si quis te percusserit in unam maxillam, praebe ei et aliam; et si quis tibi voluerit tollere pallium, relinque ei et tunicam”15placeholder (Ordinatio, III, d. 40, q. UNIQUE).
Positive law must be respected, unless it is contrary to natural law.
Scotus formulates a theory of evolutionary and progressive legislation, which is based on two factors:
- the cultural and religious context from which legislation arises
- the people to whom it is addressed
Cultural and scientific progress constitutes the environment in which legislation is born, but many different economic and social forces influence it, these forces which have their natural consequences in the exercise of political power: this changes to the extent that they also change economic and social forms.
In principle, positive law varies from people to people based on places, times and culture. Just think of marriage which, based on cultures, has always been modified. In some peoples polygamy is legal, in others it is not, in some peoples monogamy must be promoted, in others it is not important.
“Primo scilicet, quod est verum practicum simpliciter, simpliciter notum lumine naturalis rationis; et ibi potissimum gradum tenet principium praticum, notum ex terminis; secundum gradum tenet conclusio demostrata ex talibus principiis.
Secundario autem est de lege naturae quod regulariter est consonum legi maturae primo modo dictae.
Contra primum nulla cadit dispensatio, et ideo oppositum eius videtur semper esse peccatum mortale.
Contra secundum in casu cadit dispensatio in quo oppositum videretur communiter consonum legi naturae; et praecise hoc secundo modo monogamia est de lege naturae, et bigamia contra eam. Et sic concedo propositiones illas Gen. 2 et glossam Gen. 4.
Nec tamen ex hoc sequitur quod in casu non possit oppositum esse licitum, immo in casu est necessarium, et commutationum quando propter necessitatem recta ratio dictat alio modo debere fieri commutationem et quando praeceptum divinum adest. […]
Verumtamen de Lamech potest absolute concedi quod peccavit mortaliter, quia contra legem naturae; et si secundo modo, peccavit – inquam – contrahendo cum pluribus, non in casu in quo recta ratio dictaret illam legem revocandam, nec superior dispensavit, immo fuit oppositum utriusque.
Ad secundum, dico quod numquam fuit – ex parte contractus – iustitia inter commutantes sic commutare ut minus eveniat finis principalior et magis eveniat finis minus principalis, quia finis principalior est magis volendus; sed biviria magis esset ad finem minus principalem et multo minus ad finem principaliorem, quia eadem mulier infra idem tempus a pluribus viris impraegnari non potest.” (Ordinatio, IV, d. 33, q. 1).16placeholder
Scotus welcomes monogamy as right and considers it to be in agreement with natural law: monogamy is natural in human beings therefore any situation other than monogamy would be sinful.
These few hints are sufficient to give an idea, considering the small amount that Scotus dedicates to the topic, of how profound his conception of civil government and freedom is. The latter not only constitutes the basis of human existence, but is the substance of every act of the human being, the condition of its very possibility. The human being develops every field of his existence while maintaining a constant connection with the rationality that underlies freedom. The main path of social action is the concept of justice, not only as a simple legal form, but as a form of adhesion and expression of human rationality. The State, considered as the association of individual elements belonging to the people, has as its goal the development of the human person in the axiological framework that it makes its own and serves as a guarantee and guarantor of human and civil rights.
Works Cited
Alliney, G., Giovanni Duns Scoto. Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, Edizioni di Pagina, Bari 2012
Id., Fedeli, M. / Pertosa, A. (a cura di), Contingenza e libertà.cTeorie francescane del primo trecento. Atti del Convegno Internazionale (Macerata, 12-13 dicembre 2008), EUM, Macerata 2012
Bettoni, E., Duns Scoto filosofo, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1986
Bonansea, B., L’uomo e Dio nel pensiero di Duns Scoto, Jaca Book, Milano 1991
Cardini, F., Montesano, M., Storia medievale, Le Monnier, Firenze 2019
Casamenti, S. (a cura di), Etica e persona. Duns Scoto e suggestioni nel moderno, Edizioni Francescane Bologna, Bologna 1994
Cross, R., Duns Scotus on God, Ashgate, Aldershot 2004
Damiata, M., I e II tavola: L’etica di Giovanni Duns Scoto, Biblioteca di Studi Francescani, Firenze 1973
De Muralt, A., L’unité de la philosophie politique de Scot, Occam et Suárez au libéralisme contemporain, Vrin, Paris 2002
Gilson, É., Giovanni Duns Scoto: introduzione alle sue posizioni fondamentali, Jaca Book, Milano 2008
Giovanni Duns Scoto, Opera omnia, 12 voll., editi da L. Wadding, Durand, Lyon 1639 (Nachdruck Georg Olms, Hildesheim 1968)
Id., Opera omnia, 26 voll., Louis Vivès, Paris 1891-1895 (Reprint Gregg International Publishers, Westmead, Franborough and Hants 1969)
Id., Il principio di individuazione. Ordinatio 2, d. 3, pars 1, Quaestiones 1-7, a cura di A. D’Angelo, il Mulino, Bologna 2011
Ghisalberto, A. (a cura di), Giovanni Duns Scoto: filosofia e teologia, Edizioni Biblioteca Francescana, Milano 1995
Harris, C. R. S., Duns Scotus. The Place of Duns Scotus in Medieval Thought, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1927
Hobbes, T., Leviatano, Rizzoli, Milano 2011
Iammarrone, L., Giovanni Duns Scoto metafisico e teologo, le tematiche fondamentali della sua filosofia e teologia, Miscellanea Francescana, Roma 1999
Lambertini, R., La povertà pensata. Evoluzione storica della definizione dell’identità minoritica da Bonaventura ad Ockham, Mucchi, Modena 2000
Mazzantini, C., Il Problema filosofico del libero arbitrio in S. Tommaso e Duns Scoto, Editrice Tirrenia, Torino 1966
Merino, J. A., Per conoscere Giovanni Duns Scoto. Introduzione al pensiero filosofico e teologico, Edizioni Porziuncola, Santa Maria degli Angeli 2009
Parisoli, L., La contraddizione vera. Giovanni Duns Scoto tra le necessità della metafisica e il discorso della filosofia pratica, Istituto storico dei Cappuccini, Roma 2005
Rodeschini, S., Stati di natura. Saggi sul contrattualismo moderno e contemporaneo, Carocci Editore, Roma 2012
Scapin, P., Contingenza e libertà divina in Giovanni Duns Scoto, Editrice Miscellanea Francescana, Roma 1964
Serafini, M., La libertà innata. Volontà, amore e giustizia nel pensiero di Giovanni Duns Scoto, Città Nuova, Roma 2022
Vos, A., The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2006
Zavalloni, R., Giovanni Duns Scoto maestro di vita e di pensiero, Edizioni Francescane, Bologna 1992.
Human culture, of the viator man, must be considered as a mathematical limit: culture, science and technology always progress, therefore mathematically they increase, but they never reach perfection, exactly as a mathematical limit never reaches the value at which it tends even as it gets ever closer. Human reason is constitutively imperfect therefore, on this Earth, it will never be able to reach perfection, but culture, science and technology continually progress.
“Good to love, evil to avoid, decency to follow, vulgarity to hate”
“Obvious and necessarily deducible conclusions from these principles”
“But it is clear what the princes look more at, because it is more to temporal advantage than to the honor of God, and with this they want to punish and repress sins more on their neighbor than on God.”
“There is nothing except that which either follows from divine law, as practical conclusions from practical principles, or that which agrees with divine law, or at least that which does not disagree”
G. Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto. Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, Edizioni di Pagina, Bari, 2012, p. 193.
God, due to his absolute power, could change the order of the cosmos and modify the laws that human beings currently consider to be divine in nature.
S. Rodeschini, Stati di natura. Saggi sul contrattualismo moderno e contemporaneo, Carocci Editore, Roma, 2012.
G. Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto. Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, Edizioni di Pagina, Bari, 2012, p. 197.
F. Cardini, M. Montesano, Storia medievale, Le Monnier, Firenze, 2019.
T. Hobbes, Leviatano, Rizzoli, Milano, 2011.
“There is another authority, not that of the paternal presidency over his children, but that of foreigners and diverse people gathered together in some community, town or city, from which comes the authority exercised by election by those foreigners, and it can be called the authority of the prince over his subjects. In fact, in one city or country many foreign and different nations first gathered, none of which owed obedience to another, because no one had authority over another and wanted to live in such a way that his subjects obeyed him or submitted to him and the his successors according to the conditions they desired, this way or that, to hold the principality in different ways, for some only for life, others by succession.”
C. Mazzantini, Il Problema filosofico del libero arbitrio in S. Tommaso e Duns Scoto, Editrice Tirrenia, Torino 1966.
“Augustine I The City of God”: “Except those (he says) whom the just law in general or God specifically commands to be killed, whoever kills a man will be guilty of a crime.” But what is a just law, he determines it briefly in De free will, book 1: None, except that which either already follows from the divine law (as practical conclusions from practical principles), or that which agrees with the divine law, or at least that which does not contradict it end there divine law prohibits not killing; and it is not permissible for the inferior to dispense from the law of the superior; therefore no positive law, which establishes that a man must be killed, is just, if it establishes it in those cases in which God does not accept accepts in many ways, as is clear from the Ex. of the blasphemer, the murderer, the adulterer and many others. Therefore no one kills justly according to the law, unless a positive law inflicts the murder, and this is not the case be rejected by God that prohibits murder.”
“The burdens imposed in the Old Law were the moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, which at that time were necessarily bound: it is clear about morality.
Ceremonial matters are to be understood in this way, that although without mortal sin the Jews could transgress the admonition relating to ceremonial matters (for example, without mortal sin they could have touched the dead and incurred many similar impurities), yet if they did not did those things which were contained in the Law and were required for the purification of such persons, they sinned mortally, as there explained: The soul that has done thus and thus shall die the death, or shall perish from his people: for by this is meant the threat of eternal damnation.
He was also bound to all courts: either by himself, or when they were fit by their judges, – or especially by the priests of the Levitical race, if ever there was a doubtful case with the inferior judges, according to Deut.
In the New Law, however, the moral precepts are the same as then, but more explicit; the ceremonials imposed by Christ are much fewer and less numerous; There are no judgments imposed by Christ, but rather a law of meekness and humility, in which it is not necessary to have judgments, according to what Cor says. Why don’t you experience more fraud? Because Christ had taught it in Matt. 5: If someone hits you on one cheek, give him the other also; and if anyone wants to take away your cloak, leave him your tunic too.”
“First, that is, that which is simply practical truth, known simply in the light of natural reason; and there the practical principle, known by limits, occupies the most important degree; the second degree contains the conclusion demonstrated by these principles.
But it is secondary to the law of nature, which is regularly consonant with the law of maturity stated in the first way.
There is no dispensation against the first, and therefore its opposite always seems to be mortal sin.
In the second case, however, a dispensation fails in which the opposite would generally be seen as being in harmony with the law of nature; and precisely in this second way monogamy is according to the law of nature, and bigamy is contrary to it. And so I accept those Gen. 2 propositions and the gloss on Gen. 4.
And yet it does not follow that the opposite cannot be lawful in a case, rather it is necessary in a case, and when right reason dictates that the exchange must take place in another way out of necessity, and when there is a divine commandment. […]
However, it can absolutely be admitted that Lamech sinned mortally, because it was against the law of nature; and if, in the second way, he sinned – I say – by contracting with the majority, it was not in a case in which right reason would have dictated that the law be revoked, nor did the superior dispense, rather, it was the opposite of both. To the second I say that there has never been – on the part of the contract – justice between the parties in such a way that the more important end happens less and the less important end happens more, because the more important end is more to be desired ; but the biviria would be more for the less important purpose and much less for the more important purpose, because the same woman cannot become pregnant by more than one man at the same time.”