“I don’t feel like working today”: Meditations on object uses, exchanges, self-blame, suicidal ideation, and revolution
The desire to not go to work
If the cell of capitalist society is commodity exchange, what is the cell of proletarian life? It would seem to me to be the desire to not go to work. There is certainly nothing more familiar to us than this desire. Now, what is this desire to not go to work? Today we readily associate this desire with overtime work and the fatigue incurred from overtime work. The body, after a day, a week, a month of overtime work, becomes too exhausted to continue working the next day. It would much rather stay in, lie in bed, roll about, and do just about anything other than going to work. This view, it seems to me, however, is still too abstract. It sees the desire to not go to work in terms of a contradiction between something which is, in popular opinion, non-economic (the body) and economic processes which subjugate this non-economic object to themselves (work or, more precisely, wage labor). It ignores the simple fact that the worker does not wish to go to work not only because they are too exhausted to go to work, but also because they wish to do something else other than work. For one, the worker might wish to stay in bed. For another, the worker might wish to play video games instead of going to work. Now, we should also recognize here that this “something else” the worker wishes to do other than going to work is entirely economic. If the worker wishes to stay in bed, they must own or have rented at the very least a room, a flat, or a house where they may place their bed and sleep in their bed. If the worker wishes to play video games, they must own the video games they wish to play, as well as a computer or a gaming console with which they may play these video games. They must also pay the electricity as well as Internet bills in order to play these video games. Having recognized the economic nature of the many “something elses” our worker wishes to do other than going to work, we would also recognize that these “something elses” also depend upon the worker’s work. Obviously, the worker must pay the various rents, bills, taxes, and so forth which allow them to maintain their lives where they may enjoy these many “something elses” and, to be able to pay these rents, bills, taxes, and so forth, they must, obviously, work, so as to be paid a wage, so that they may do these “something elses”.
Here then, in the desire to not go to work, which is, in truth, the desire to do something else other than going to work, we find a fatal contradiction which, affectively, we may say, is inseparable from the self-blame and suicidal ideation we find often in burned-out and depressed workers, but first things first: the fatal contradiction we have before us is a contradiction between two economic courses of action, between going to work and doing a certain “something else”. This contradiction is fatal because doing “something else” other than going to work is dependent upon the worker going to work, and yet it also deters the worker from going to work. Case in point, let’s imagine a worker who refused to go to work and chose, instead, to stay in and sleep all day. Let’s say that the regular wage the worker receives monthly is enough for them to pay for their rent. By failing to show up for work and choosing, instead, to stay in bed, the worker loses some of their wage. As they do, they also become incapable of paying any longer for their rent simply with their monthly wage. They must, instead, pay out of their savings, if they have any. In other words, the worker, by refusing to go to work and, instead, choosing to stay in bed, drains their savings. Now, imagine the same worker, burned-out, depressed, and no longer able to go to work, having missed work for an entire year. Their savings have almost entirely been drained. They are on the verge of losing their job and being evicted from their flat, but still they are too burned-out and depressed to go to work. They still prefer and do, indeed, choose to stay in bed rather than go to work. We see here, clearly then, the fatality of the contradiction between going to work and doing “something else” other than going to work. The latter (economic) course of action cannot be taken or, rather, cannot be taken for a prolonged duration without the former also being taken. The worker needs to be paid their monthly wage to keep on doing this “something else”, but the wish to do this “something else” is here preventing the worker from going to work. To invoke the classical distinction between the potential and the actual, we may say that what we have here are two potential courses of action competing with one another for actualization, with their competition ending in a deadlock. The latter potential can only be actualized when the former has been actualized, and yet the latter, demanding its actualization before the former, deters the actualization of the former. Hence, neither potential can be actualized. The latter, by deterring the actualization of the former, effectively, deterred its own actualization as well. More concretely, the worker cannot stay in bed or, rather, cannot continue staying in bed without going to work and receiving their monthly wage, but their desire to stay in bed precisely deters the worker from going to work and receiving that wage. Hence, the worker, if they choose to stay in bed, is sure to be insomniac or stir awake many times a night from nightmares of the future when they, having missed out on work over and over and lost most, if not all, of their wages, having, as such, no choice but to pay their rent out of their savings and drained almost entirely their savings, can no longer continue staying in bed. The “something else” they wish to do instead of going to work can no longer be actualized. This “something else”’s actualization over the actualization of the potential of going to work slowly sets the stage for a nightmarish future when this “something else” can no longer be actualized any longer. Trepidation and anticipation of this future accompany every step of the development of the contradiction between going to work and staying in bed instead of going to work (as well as every other “something else”).
Use-world and exchanges
The individual worker has a use-world. This use-world is structured by relations of exchanges. What is a use-world? A use-world consists of various object uses, objects of use, and durations of use. If you would excuse my Heideggerianism too, I would also like to add that every object use is inseparable from every other object use. A hammer is used to hammer a nail which is, in turn, used to keep a wall in place, alongside with three or four or six other walls, a floor, a roof which together form a house, which, of course, is used as shelter from the rain and other elements detrimental to our well-being. A use-world is a network of interconnected object uses, objects of use, and the durations of these object uses.
Now, what is a relation of exchange? Taking after Marx, I think we may express a relation of exchange with the following formula:
x quantity of commodity A = y quantity of commodity B
The most common or, rather, the relation of exchange we are the most acquainted with, I should think, is the relation or set of relations which make up our daily work. At work, we produce a certain quantity of a certain commodity and are paid with a certain wage, with which we purchase the many commodities necessary to keep us in good working conditions, to go to work again the next day and produce the same quantity of the same commodity, to be paid a wage, to purchase the commodities necessary to keep us in good working conditions, to go to work again, ad infinitum.
Here we may note that x and y correspond to certain durations of object uses. A certain quantity of a certain commodity takes, obviously, a certain amount of time to produce and, in our productive activities, obviously, again, we make use of various objects. This much is self-evident. We must also note now, though, that any change to x and y does not only change the durations of the object uses which produce commodities A and B. Other object uses, objects of use, and durations of object uses are changed as well. For one instance, if the monthly quota we are expected to meet in order to be paid the same wage as the previous month has been increased, more time would, obviously, have to be expended on meeting this new, increased quota. As more time is expended at work, more time is also required for us to recuperate from the fatigue incurred from the increased work hours. Or, as is more common today, when we are not allowed to spend more time recuperating from the fatigue incurred from work, we make use of other objects, never before used by us, in order to enhance the quality of our sleep (e.g. sleeping pills). We might also make use of other objects to enhance our efficiency at work (e.g. energy drinks). These objects, obviously, for the most parts, cost money. In order to buy these objects, we must make adjustments to our spendings. In order to introduce and integrate these objects into our use-world, we must make adjustments to our other object uses, objects of use, and durations of object uses. We might have to cut down on other living costs, give up certain objects we have become accustomed to using, work even longer hours in order to secure the funds necessary for purchasing these new objects, and so forth. In other words, any change to x and y changes the composition of the entire network of object uses, objects of use, and durations of object uses—changes the composition of our use-world.
Now, finally, we must also note that a relation of exchange is not some free-floating relation which determines the composition of our use-world “from above”. In a large way, we may say that a relation of exchange is, in truth, several object uses by the worker whom I am and the other workers and capitalists with whom I am in exchange. We have, first and foremost, the object uses by me and the other which produced the commodities which are then entered into exchange. Secondly, we have the uses of these commodities in exchange: the giving-away of these commodities to the other in order to acquire from the other the commodities produced by them. Thirdly, we have our and the other’s uses of the commodities acquired from exchange. A relation of exchange, we may say then, is entirely embedded within our and the other’s use-worlds which, through this relation of exchange, become anchored to one another.
Contradictions in the use-world
Now, returning to the desire to not go to work and the fatal contradiction that it is, we may say that the contradiction which is this desire—the contradiction between going to work and doing “something else” other than going to work—is a contradiction between two potential object uses within a worker’s use-world. It is a competition between two potential object uses which ends in a deadlock because the “something else” cannot be actualized without the worker going to work and yet demands its actualization before the actualization of the potential of going to work. In striving towards its actualization before the actualization of the potential of going to work, this “something else” prevents its own actualization or, more concretely, in everyday life, it is actualized at the expense of the worker’s savings which are slowly drained as the worker continues to refuse to go to work. It generates an anxious anticipation of a future when, the savings having been completely drained, this “something else” can no longer be actualized any longer. What appears to be an either/or turns out to be a neither/nor, or, at the very least, sets the stage for a future neither/nor. Unable to actualize either, or anticipating a future when neither can be actualized any longer, the worker falls into self-blame which develops, over time, following popular narratives, into suicidal ideation.
The question now, of course, is how the worker ended up in this contradiction. Here we may look to the common opinion which attributes the desire to not go to work to terrible work conditions, to, for one instance, too much overtime work. Overtime work can be understood as an increase in certain durations of object uses in the worker’s use-world, which, we may further add, is brought about by changes in the x and y in the formula, x quantity of commodity A = y quantity of commodity B. As these durations of object uses are increased, the composition of the entire use-world is changed as well. The duration of rest needed to recover the energy necessary for tomorrow’s work is increased. Other objects might be introduced into the use-world in order to enhance the worker’s quality of sleep, their efficiency at work, and so forth (sleeping pills, energy drinks, etc.). In these changes to the composition of the worker’s use-world, we find a potential cause to the desire to not go to work, because changes to the composition of the worker’s use-world are not always changes “for the better”. The use of sleeping pills might cause drowsiness at work and, hence, loss of work efficiency. The use of energy drinks might leave the worker restless even after work, loaded with too much energy to fall asleep as quickly as they used to, before they began using energy drinks. From the many “side effects” of the objects newly introduced into the worker’s use-world, and, in general, the many changes made to the composition of the worker’s use-world, stem the contradictions between potential object uses which, despite their dependence upon the other for their own actualization, self-cripplingly deters the actualization of the other. In other, plainer words, the desire to not go to work might stem from an inability to adjust one’s “schedule” (i.e. one’s use-world) to new demands made of oneself at work (e.g. increased monthly quota, that is to say, changes to x and y).
Now, since the word “adjustment” has been brought up, it is worth pointing out that the desire to not go to work cannot be attributed to some fault in the worker’s own “character”. Why this must be pointed out should be plain to anyone who is honest with themselves. As soon as the word “adjustment” is brought up, we are faced immediately with the temptation to blame the worker’s desire to not go to work on the worker’s own “laziness”, “feeble-mindedness”, “lack of flexibility”, and so forth, but, of course, doing so is of no difference from blaming the impoverishment of the poor on their “refusal to work hard”. This kind of reasoning cannot be farther from the truth, as the desire to not go to work is born from changes to the composition of the worker’s use-world, which correspond to changes in the relations of exchange which structure the worker’s use-world. It might be noted too that I am not speaking here only of the relations of exchange which make up wage labor either. Sleeping pills, energy drinks, and other objects introduced into the worker’s use-world in order to meet the new demands made of them at work would have to be bought from others. In other words, the worker, by introducing these objects into their use-world, must enter themselves into new relations of exchange with others. Other objects which the worker is already using but does not own completely, like their rented flat, would have to be maintained by paying a certain sum of money to the others who own them. Here, again, the worker stands in relations of exchange with others. Everywhere the worker stands in relations of exchange with others, and these relations of exchange, more so than some ethereal “strength of character” “within” the worker, determine the composition of the worker’s use-world. The desire to not go to work, or the contradiction between potential object uses which it is, stems more from the relations of exchange than some fault in the worker’s “character”, which, in the first place, is too ill-defined to be worth speaking of at length anyways.
In simultaneity, of course, we should also understand these relations of exchange not as some “external” processes which have subjugated the worker to their own ends. They are not some Big Bad System invading the worker’s otherwise pristine and idyllic personal space, depriving the worker of their “natural freedoms”. To the contrary, these relations of exchange are—or, at the very least, correspond to—object uses by the worker and the others with whom the worker is in exchange. As I have said earlier in the previous section, a relation of exchange is six object uses by the worker whom I am and the other with whom I am in exchange: two object uses by me and the other which produced the commodities exchanged, two object uses which are my and the other giving away the commodities in exchange, and two final object uses which are my and the other using the commodities acquired from one another in exchange. Relations of exchange are entirely social, socioeconomic relations between the worker and the others with whom they are in exchange. They are points of contact between use-worlds; the use-world of the worker whom I am and the use-worlds of the others with whom I am exchange.
Self-blame and suicidal ideation
Corresponding to the desire to not go to work, or the fatal contradiction between going to work and doing “something else” other than going to work, seems to be the affective state that is self-blame. Why a worker suffering from this desire and fatal contradiction would fall into self-blame is not difficult to imagine. The worker cannot do this “something else” without, first, going to work and yet nevertheless wishes to do this “something else” before going to work. The apparent choice between going to work and doing this “something else” turns out to be no choice at all. The worker can do neither. Or, more precisely, the worker does this “something else” while looking ahead, the entire time, to the future when they can no longer do this “something else”; when they can do neither. The worker is a loser or a loser-to-be. They satisfy their urges to do this “something else” temporarily, in such a way that they destine themselves to losing their ability to satisfy these urges any longer in the future.
As self-blame develops, according to popular narratives at least, it develops, in time, into suicidal ideation. Let us, for the moment, simply accept this to be the case. Immediately though, if my analysis of the desire to not go to work and the contradiction which it is has been correct, we would note that this development from self-blame to suicidal ideation has not been a linear one. Of course, the worker might contemplate death because they have grown to loathe themselves so much that they wish to end their own life, but there is a fundamental difference between suicidal ideation and the self-blame which precedes it. Self-blame occurs from a competition between potential object uses which ends in a deadlock where neither potential object use can be actualized. Within self-blame are two or two sets of potential object uses striving towards their actualizations, futilely. It is a tragedy of “Can I? Can’t I?” culminating every time in a resounding “I can’t”. Suicidal ideation, on the other hand, concerns itself with a single potential object use which, when actualized, would disable altogether the actualization of every other potential object use. Considering suicidal ideation in relation to self-blame, we may say that suicidal ideation introduces a third potential object use to the two potential object uses in contradiction within self-blame. This third potential object use, as soon as it is introduced, takes over the contradiction and singularly demands its actualization, upon which the contradiction between the two prior potential object uses would dissolve completely. In the most disturbing way, suicidal ideation aims to kill the worker’s pains at their sources: by terminating altogether the competition of potential object uses striving towards their actualization which has landed the worker in such pain.
Suicidal ideation, while being, supposedly, a more advanced stage of self-blame, turns out, then, to be a negation of self-blame. It stands in contradiction to self-blame, which is still passionate at heart and is born of the futility of these passions, never bearing fruit in any action. Suicidal ideation, on the other hand, would have none of these passions. It is a passion which, passionately, demands the end to all other passions, because these other passions, in their strivings towards their actualizations, have entered into a deadlock which brought the worker too much pain.
Resolution
The final question to be asked now is how the contradiction between self-blame and suicidal ideation may be resolved. Here, again, we may begin by looking at what is commonly said of or, rather, prescribed to workers who blame themselves to the point of contemplating their own deaths. We find ourselves face-to-face, immediately, with the wide assortments of antidepressants, counseling services, therapy sessions, and so on. Neither self-blame nor suicidal ideation, it would seem, is some “phase” one is expected to “outgrow” “naturally”, “spontaneously”, and so forth. The introduction of a third term, it would seem, is a prerequisite to “curing” the worker who has fallen into self-blame and suicidal ideation. We may take this as a hint and devise for ourselves our own resolution to the contradiction between self-blame and suicidal ideation.
For my own part, consequent of the structures I have set forth, I can conceive of no third term other than the recognition of the relations of exchange which structure our use-world. As these relations of exchange structure our use-world—that is to say, they structure the networks of interconnected object uses, objects of use, and durations of object uses—as quantities x and y in these relations change, and, as the relations of exchange themselves come and go, they engender also within our use-world the contradiction which is self-blame and, as self-blame develops, the contradiction between self-blame and suicidal ideation. This recognition, of course, is not a recognition of some “external” processes which have subjugated us to them, upon which we can displace all our blame and, more importantly, responsibility for ourselves. Rather, it is a recognition of the structuring relations of exchange as six object uses of ours and others’ which have significantly determined the composition of our and others’ use-worlds.
Upon this recognition, we may also begin to determine our next courses of actions—our next potential object uses which take aim at the relations of exchange, at the object uses of ours and others’ which have made us so miserable. Upon this recognition, living on in a use-world anchored to the same use-worlds of others’, bound to ours in the same relations of exchange, becomes out of the question. The self-blaming and suicidal soul, leaping for the first time beyond self-blame and suicidal ideation, learns to yearn for a new use-world and struggles towards it. Together with other workers, we rise up to amend the terms and, even, the relations of exchange themselves for our own sake. Against capitalists, we rise up in strikes and boycotts. We take up placards and loudspeakers. We withdraw from the consumption of capitalist products. Thus it is that our darkest hours are turned into the preface of a new (use-)world.