How is one to understand empirical objects in a transcendentally idealist system? Despite the thorough attempt of Immanuel Kant to establish the a priori ground of our experience in his Critique of Pure Reason1placeholder, the work shows its cracks at the exact point where it needs to reconcile the empirical with the transcendental. Following this fault line will show a different Kant than the one we usually see. A Kant which exhibits a materialist dimension. This may be found in a section of the first critique called the Anticipations of Perception.2placeholder
In the Anticipations Kant attempts to establish a priori knowledge regarding a posteriori content. In his explanation of the transcendental aspects of the empirical, Kant implicitly relies on psychological factors and in this way jeopardizes some of the critical demarcations of his project. The problem becomes pressing for Kant as the Anticipations also aim to elucidate how objects affect our senses, thus posing the question of how are we to conceptualise this affection in a transcendentally valid manner?
The pre-critical work of Kant specifically the True Estimation of Living Forces, may shed some light on the issue. The pre-critical and critical period are often deemed incompatible. But does not, by necessity, mean that the problems that undergird both periods are not similar. The pre-critical work is defined, contrary to the critical break, by a commensurability between intelligible and sensible. This does point, however, to an overlap in the problems Kant deals with in each period. And since the problem of the Anticipations stems from attempting to elucidate the relation between sensible and intelligible, the pre-critical work may provide a possible answer to its theoretical dilemmas. The current inquiry will examine, specifically, to what extent the metaphysical principle of force introduced in True Estimation of Living Forces can provide an answer to the psychologistic tendency which defines the Anticipations. In doing so a different side to Kant emerges. A Kant whose critical architecture can only be supported by assuming a peculiar, materialist, metaphysical principle. In raising his transcendental cathedral, Kant smuggles in matter via the backdoor.
The following inquiry will start by considering how the Anticipations stand in relation to the larger critical project. This is to show the specific type of transcendental knowledge that it aims to establish, namely, a priori knowledge about a posteriori content. Secondly, it will be shown how a form of psychologism lurks within these pages, by analysing the difference between the proofs in the A and B edition of the Anticipations. Thirdly, it will be discussed how said psychologism threatens the overall goals of this section. And what rises to the fore in this discussion is that the affection of the senses cannot be exhaustively explained. Finally, by analysing the True Estimation of Living Forces it will argued that due to the overlap in problems with the Anticipations, the metaphysical principle introduced the early may account for a description of affectivity, however, this requires a step beyond the transcendental framework. A reintroduction of the metaphysics Kant so vehemently tried to banish from critical project.
Anticipating the Object
Before discussing the specifics of the Anticipations of Perception it is necessary to discuss the broader goals of the Critique, to elucidate the position said section occupies within the structure of Kant’s work.
One of the central goals of Kant’s work Critique of Pure Reason is setting metaphysics on course to become a rigorous and secure form of science.3placeholder In his attempt to reorient metaphysics Kant sets out the conditions by means of which our understanding should be investigated specifically as apart from experience and constitutive of the form of experience as such. This is to guarantee the legitimacy and purity of claims made by metaphysics.4placeholder Herein lies Kant’s transcendental approach to experience, as aimed at investigating the non-empirical foundations of experience.5placeholder In so doing Kant alters the classical epistemological presumption of metaphysics, the clear correspondence between subject and object. Instead of an overlap the subject itself takes centre stage in dictating the formal rules for the appearance of the object.6placeholder In this manner Kant intends to avoid explaining our cognition by means of mere empirical psychological givens.7placeholder Using psychology to explain cognition would remain empirical as it concerns itself with our subjective mechanisms of knowing and not with the transcendental conditions for establishing a priori knowledge.8placeholder To reach this goal, Kant examines our process of cognition.
In establishing how our cognition works Kant divides it into two registers. Firstly, Kant considers our sensibility, or how we produce representations based on the impressions on our senses. Sensibility provides the formal a priori conditions for the appearance of an object, namely space and time.9placeholder However, on the level of sensibility we cannot speak of objects, yet. What is required additionally is that the objects are related to concepts, to concretely formulate that we have a representation of something.10placeholder This function is ascribed to the understanding. Whilst through sensibility objects are given they are thought by the understanding, which works with concepts rather than impressions. The task of the understanding, then, is order our intuitions and by doing so connect them to a common representation.11placeholder In short, Kant makes an explicit split between sensibility and understanding, which both contain a priori elements. But both play a crucial role constitution of experience. Experience is exactly the result of the synthesis of intuitions and concepts.12placeholder Kant’s theory of experience, thus hinges on the convergence of two registers, that of sensibility and the understanding. However, as one deals with experiences and the other with concepts their nature is radically different. What then needs to be explained is how these heterogenous registers overlap. By means of the transcendental deduction Kant provided a foundation for the overlap between sensibility and understanding. However, this overlap pertains only to the formal conditions of experience. The matter of appearances, or their empirical character has not yet been explained. And said empirical character cannot be accounted for by mere pure a priori principles.13placeholder Considering the necessity of the empirical for experience, what needs to be addressed is where these empirical objects come from and according to which principles they can be explained.
But how do empirical objects fit into the rigid structure of transcendental critique? Considering the role of the understanding in constituting experience Kant attempts to explain the way in which the understanding anticipates matter within sensation, or the empirical moment, hence establishing a priori what is normally only given a posteriori.14placeholder In the section the Anticipations said problem takes centre stage. To elucidate the relationship between the empirical object and critique more broadly, this section will be examined in more detail below.
In the Anticipations Kant provides an account of how the categories can actually apply themselves to appearances.15placeholder In other words, the Anticipations are aimed at determining the a priori aspects of empirical knowledge, the material aspect of appearance rather than its formal qualities.16placeholder The Anticipations describe a form of transcendental knowledge, however, it is transcendental in an unusual sense as it pertains to a posteriori qualities. Kant showed how the subject transcendentally constitutes experience, so how objects are given to us is subject to a priori principles. Yet the other aspects of our experience, such as heat, colour, sound etc., are mere subjective aspects and do not give us any a priori knowledge. But these are the exact aspects which need to be explained.17placeholder And Kant is aware of the paradoxical nature of his inquiry, as he states:
“But if it were supposed that there is something which can be cognized a priori in every sensation, as sensation in general (without a particular one being given), then this would deserve to be called an anticipation in an unusual sense, since it seems strange to anticipate experience precisely in what concerns its matter, which one can draw out of it. And this is actually how things stand.”18placeholder [my emphasis]
The question, as it now stands, is how we can anticipate before experience that which, by its nature, requires experience?
In the ‘Proof’ of the Anticipations, Kant introduces the distinction between extensive and intensive magnitude to elucidate the a priori aspect of empirical objects. Whilst the specific qualities of these objects may not be given without referring to experience itself, Kant will maintain that one can, nevertheless, anticipate the formal qualities.19placeholder It is at this point that the distinction between extensive and intensive magnitudes comes in.
Firstly, Kant explains that, regarding the quantity of sensations one can only formally anticipate one aspect, that of being continuous. And he introduces the notion of extensive magnitude to describe this. He states: “I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representation of the parts makes possible the representation of the whole …”.20placeholder Extensive magnitudes are magnitudes which can be added together, small quantities added together form larger quantities. Regarding empirical qualities he utilises the concept of intensive magnitudes. But in the case of intensive magnitudes the logic is different. Intensive magnitudes can only be comprehended as a whole, and must be understood as differences in degree. For example, heat cannot be added together, two cups of 20-degree water do not make 40 degrees. Intensive magnitudes differ with regard to their distribution, some bodies are hotter than others and the difference between them can be recognised as long as it is not zero.21placeholder Hence Kant states: “I call that magnitude which can only be apprehended as a unity, and in which multiplicity can only be represented through the approximation to negation = 0, intensive magnitude”.22placeholder As the formal conditions of our experience cannot be perceived in themselves extensive and intensive magnitudes allow for the differentiation within phenomenal reality.23placeholder Or how reality is filled up. In light of this discussion Kant goes a step further. The notion of intensive magnitude becomes a way to explain how our senses are affected.
In addition to attempting to describe how one can cognise the a priori aspects of an empirical object, the Anticipations also touch upon the nature of affection of the senses. Kant starts out by explaining that appearances contain something beyond the formal determinations of space and time. They contain the real of sensation, by means of which one can “only be conscious that the subject is affected, and which one relates to an object’ in general.”24placeholder The relationship between objects and senses is re-articulated within the structure of intensive-extensive magnitudes as Kant claims: “all objects of perception, insofar as they contain sensation, must be ascribed an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of influence on sense.”25placeholder Hence the Anticipations also concerns itself with how objects affect our senses. Or, more concretely, that due to their qualities they allow the subject to be affected. However, as cognition requires both sensation and understanding, how can one ascribe qualities to sensation alone and, moreover, use it to explain how our senses are affected? Is Kant not utilising psychological mechanisms to describe transcendental structures, which he aimed to avoid? In this instance, it becomes relevant to the current inquiry to discuss the alleged psychologism which lurks in Kant’s argumentation.26placeholder This is done to discuss the extent to which the status of the object is susceptible to said criticism.
Transcendental Psychologisms
In the previous section it was questioned to what extent the Anticipations maintain the anti-psychologistic aims of the Critique. What is necessary now is to explain how this problem unfolds exactly within the text. This is best elucidated by discussing the difference between the formulation of sensation within the A and B edition.
The first edition describes sensation as follows: “In all appearances the sensation, and the real, which corresponds to it in the ‘object’, has an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree.”27placeholder In this formulation both the real and sensation are ascribed the characteristic of intensive magnitude. In the second edition Kant significantly alters the description: “ In all appearances the real, which is an object of the sensation, has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree.”28placeholder The difference lies in the notion of the real, which, in the second edition, becomes an object of sensation, as opposed to the equation in the first edition. What appears to happen is that Kant ascribes a characteristic to that which lies beyond the confines of transcendental inquiry, in the A-edition at least. Only objects of sensation can be cognised and not sensation as such. In this manner Kant applies a psychological given of our experience, intensive magnitude, beyond its proper realm of use. The B-edition attempts to circumvent said threat, however, even there Kant appears to overstep his own boundaries. As he states for example: “every sensation, thus also every reality in appearances … has a degree”.29placeholder In other words, Kant still maintains that sensation has the quality of degree, or intensive magnitude. Consequently, he does not avoid psychologistic logic. Taking into account the aims of the Anticipations, and its latent psychologism, it becomes clear that both the qualities of the empirical object and how it affects our senses cannot be thoroughly explained within the critical framework. So, the transcendental validity of our empirical knowledge is, subsequently, also under threat. Despite these criticisms, there is a way that one can respond from a Kantian perspective.
A possible line of response to the lingering psychologism, was provided by Béatrice Longuenesse. Attempting to salvage Kant’s account, Longuenesse starts by emphasising how sensation in itself cannot be quantified, but our appearances can. She states: “Indeed, only the ‘real of appearances,’ not sensation, is accessible to mathematical cognition. In other words, saying that sensation is ultimately our only source of cognition of the intensive magnitude of the real of appearances is certainly not saying that we can apply quantitative determination (i.e., measure) to sensation itself.”30placeholder Our empirical judgements can henceforth be legitimised as they pertain only to phenomena, not to sensations prior to the act of cognising the object. Whilst being an elegant response to the psychologism laid out above, there is one aspect which missing. As mentioned before there is another problem that the Anticipations intend to answer, namely, the manner of affecting the senses. However, this part remains unarticulated within Longuenesse’s response, and does not immediately follow from her rebuttal. It is unclear how the intensive magnitude of appearances can ground how our senses are affected. Accordingly, the response provided by Longuenesse remains incomplete on this front.
In order to provide a possible response to said problem the inquiry will turn to Kant’s pre-critical period. During this period of Kant’s intellectual development, he propagates a view of reality as having an intelligible and sensible side which coherently overlap, contrary to split introduced in the Critique.31placeholder The aim of the next section is to examine the relationship between sensations and our representations of it, within the pre-critical period. And the question thus becomes how Kant’s early writings can inform our understanding of the position of the empirical object as articulated in the Critique?
Pre-Critical Influx
The first point that ought to be addressed is why the current inquiry turns towards the pre-critical period of Kant’s work specifically. Within the traditional understanding of Kant’s intellectual development, enforced by Kant’s own comments, the works predating the famous Critiques are often dismissed, understood as incompatible with innovations of the critical project.32placeholder Such a form of incompatibility does not, however, mean that the problems which undergird both periods do not overlap. As Gerd Buchdahl states: “If Kant’s thought developed, and changed radically, one is apt to exaggerate the extent of these changes. More often than not traditional attitudes are merely integrated into new vistas; and the latter may even be subtly modified to accord with the earlier and older framework.”33placeholder Taking said position seriously, provides one with the question as to how the issues from the pre-critical period extend into the critiques. Moreover, to what extent the answer provided in the early work can elucidate the problem in its later stages.
The specific work which will be considered is Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces,34placeholder as it concerns itself with the relationship between the physical influx of forces in matter and the representations that occur in the mind because of it.35placeholder It will be argued that the goals of Living Forces and the Anticipations overlap due to their focus on cognising empirical objects and ground the affection of the senses. The twofold structure of the problem of Anticipations in fact finds its nascent form in the discussion of Living Forces. Whilst recognising that the problems of the two texts are in fact different, there is, nevertheless, an overlap in their concern. In addition, it will be examined whether the metaphysical principle provided in Living Forces can solve the problem of the affectivity of the senses, which was missing in the account of the Anticipations.
First and foremost, it is necessary to describe Kant’s theoretical ambitions in Living Forces. Both historically and in terms of content, Living Forces engages with the so-called vis viva debate. A controversy surrounding the status of forces within bodies of motion, and which of these forces is conserved. Two of the prominent thinkers engaged in the debate were Descartes and Leibniz. The latter proposed an active principle to account for the constant change within the world, which he dubbed vis viva.36placeholder Whilst a complete account of physical specificities is beyond the scope of the current inquiry, it is important to highlight how Kant adopts the philosophical underpinnings of these positions. In Living Forces Kant tries to synthesise the Cartesian and Leibnizian positions on the notion of force in nature.37placeholder In this manner Kant tries to combine both physical and metaphysical principles within one framework. Said convergence of registers manifests itself clearly in the 6th section of Living Forces where Kant attempts to epistemologically ground the influence of matter on the mind, in contrast with the Leibnizian doctrine of pre-established harmony. However, he does so by ascribing a metaphysical principle to matter.38placeholder Having described the general orientation of the text, the specific overlap with the Anticipations ought to be considered.
Regarding the first problem that the Anticipations aimed to solve, one ought to consider the influence of Leibniz on Kant’s work. They share an occupation with the notion of forces. And Kant adopts Leibniz explanation regarding forces and their (meta)physical position. In his occupation regarding the vis viva debate Leibniz makes a clear distinction between types of forces to combine the physical explanation of phenomena with metaphysical principles. Despite the emphasis on the physical, Leibniz, nevertheless, maintains the status of the phenomenal reality as a derivative of its metaphysical basis.39placeholder Although he is sympathetic to the Leibnizian system Kant does intend to improve it on this exact point. Kant introduces a distinction between free and dead motion. The former inheres in a body and remains infinite unless acted upon, whilst the latter depends on an outside source and hence stops the moment said force disappears.40placeholder Even though there appears to be a congruency with Leibniz on this issue Kant explicitly mentions the necessity of providing a mathematical basis for elucidating the principles he explains on a metaphysical level.41placeholder In this manner Kant makes a clear distinction between our manner of understanding nature and mathematics, as the way we measure living or dead forces is radically different due to their divergence in register. In this way one can observe the overlap between Living Forces and Anticipations as both aim to explicate the nature of empirical objects and, in turn, ground empirical judgements about them. A clear distinction does need to be noted as the metaphysical principle of force, as propagated in Living Forces, is overtly reliant on experience.42placeholder Hence it is not in conformity with the a priori forms of knowledge which are necessary following the epistemological requirements of the Critique. But it may be in fact this systematic position that the notion force occupies, that allows for it to address the second problem the Anticipations try to solve.
Concerning the second problem of the Anticipations, what needs to be addressed is how Kant deals with affection of the senses in Living Forces. The latter deals explicitly with the topic as it aims to examine the relationship between the efficacy of matter and our representation of it. In the 5th and 6th section of his work Kant addresses how his reconceptualization of force allows one to articulate the causal connection between matter and mind, and the other way around.43placeholder The problematic between matter and our representations of it can be solved, following Kant, by showing how extension and spatial locality are the result of the forces themselves. Force, according to Kant, is the common but differentiating factor which undergirds the relationships between the various things which exist in our world.44placeholder As both mind and matter are the result of influx of forces, prior to phenomenal reality, the heterogeneity between the two registers is removed. By stressing the dependence on force, of both mind and matter Kant can allow for a clear causal connection, through a shared ground.45placeholder Consequently, the affectivity of the senses by matter can be explained. Based on these considerations it can be stated the principle of force provides a manner of accounting for the affectivity of the senses. However, due to its overt reliance on experience it cannot be considered a priori knowledge, hence not meeting the requirements of the Critique. Having discussed the overlap between the problems of both the pre-critical and critical work, it is now necessary to see how the engagement with the former may allow for a possible response to the theoretical deadlock of the latter.
As examined above, one of the problems faced by the Critique was how the empirical object is cognised, and consequently, how the affection of our senses takes place. Following the latent psychologism in the Anticipations it became clear that the status of the empirical object was not thoroughly explained. Specifically, on the question affecting the sense the Critique remains general in its account.46placeholder The analysis of Longuenesse provides a possible response, but falter on the exact point that needs to be explained. The metaphysical notion of force may be introduced to circumvent these problems. But a pre-critical or metaphysical, principle, cannot be legitimately placed within the demarcations of critical philosophy. Consequently, in order to safeguard our ability to understand how our senses are affected requires a jump outside the transcendental system. Moreover, it requires a specific understanding
Conclusion
This inquiry has attempted to describe to what extent the psychologistic problems which arise in the Anticipations can be circumvented by the application of the metaphysical principle of force as introduced in the Living Forces. By examining the place of the Anticipations within the larger project of the Critique it was shown how it attempted to the describe the formal, or a priori, aspects of the empirical part of experience. Kant’s introduction of intensive and extensive magnitudes was considered to elucidate how one could anticipate a priori characteristics of a posteriori content. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the notion of intensive magnitude showed an illegitimate application of psychological givens on a transcendental level. Accordingly, the goals of the Anticipations could not be fully accounted for within the transcendental framework. Thus, the question of how our senses are affected remains untouched. By elaborating on the overlap between the Anticipations and Living Forces, in terms of the problem both texts aim to solve, it was proclaimed that the metaphysical principle of force was a possible way to avoid the problem of affectivity. Due to its reliance on experience, however, said principle had to be rejected in accordance with the critical demarcations. Consequently, it became clear that how the senses are affected cannot be completely accounted for given the standards of transcendental philosophy. Instead, it requires a step beyond its own boundaries.
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Kant, Immanuel. Critique Of Pure Reason, p. 290
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Kant, Immanuel. Critique Of Pure Reason, p. 290
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Kant, Immanuel. “Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces and Assessment of the Demonstrations That Leibniz and Other Scholars of Mechanics Have Made Use of in This Controversial Subject, Together with Some Prefatory Considerations Pertaining to the Force of Bodies in General (1746–1749).” Chapter. In Kant: Natural Science, edited by Eric Watkins, 1–155. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 30-1
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